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FTS in Business cycles examines the dynamic effects and empirical signifi-
cance of Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks in the context of US business cycles. FTS
represents a sudden preference for safe over risky investments and contains im-
portant information on agents’ time varying risk-aversion and their expectations
for future economic activity. This analysis presents an identification for FTS
shocks using vector autoregressions (VAR). Sign restrictions are applied, while
controlling for monetary policy and productivity shocks, on the price differential
series between stocks and bonds in the US. Identified positive disturbances to
this differential series are characterised as FTS shocks. The business cycle impact
of FTS is calculated by applying the structural VAR model to the US economic
data from 1955 to 2019. A sudden increase in risk aversion, which is displayed
through the FTS shocks in the identified VAR model, has played a significant
role in keeping investments low in the US. FTS shocks explain more than sixty
percent of the variation in US investments and they explain a higher proportion of
macroeconomic fluctuations in periods around the Global financial crisis. This is a
significant linkage when compared against results of DSGE models enriched with
time-varying risk-premium and investment technology. FTS also comes up ahead
of news shocks in providing early signals of shifts in total factor productivity.
This analysis is consistent with other comparable high-frequency, kernel-based
measures of identifying FTS. The results also reveal the asymmetric impact on the
business cycle of Flight to Safety and its complement Flight to Risk phenomenon.
This asymmetry lends support to pursuing a cyclical risk-aversion driven view of
business cycles.
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1 Introduction
How can we identify Flight to Safety shocks? Do they have any significant effect
on the economy and the business cycles? Does the Flight to Safety phenomenon
warrant much attention if the shift of investments from risky to safe assets over
one week reverses in the next week? These are some important questions of
interest to both investors and policymakers alike. This chapter proposes answers
to these and similar questions using sign-based restrictions in identifying the
Flight to Safety shocks through vector autoregressions. Doing so also opens up
new avenues to improve our understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their
propagation mechanisms in business cycles.
The Flight to Safety shocks in this chapter represent unexpected positive inno-
vations to households’ risk aversion, or these are the shocks that lower investor’s
risk appetite. There are many instances in the financial markets, e.g. the Lehman
crisis period and the Covid-19 period, when an increase in risk aversion and un-
certainty has led to bursts of flight of investment capital from risky to safe assets.
Such instances are commonly referred to as Flight to Safety (FTS). Similarly, any
unexpected reduction in risk aversion, which then motivates a flight of investment
capital in the reverse direction, i.e., from safe to risky assets, is known as Flight to
Risk (FTR). This chapter investigates the impact and transmission of innovations
to investors’ risk aversion on financial markets, macroeconomic aggregates, and
business cycles through the medium of Flight to Safety shocks.
The method for identifying Flight to Safety shocks in this chapter builds on
Uhlig’s (2005) agnostic identification strategy of imposing sign restrictions on
the impulse response functions. This method identifies Flight to Safety shocks
in a five variable structural vector autoregressions (S-VAR) model by imposing
sign restrictions on impulse responses in four out of five macroeconomic series of
the S-VAR, viz. TFP, price of risk, real rates, and surplus ratio. The TFP is
adjusted for factor-utilization (Fernald, 2012). The price of risk series is obtained
by differencing the S&P 500 index price from the price of long-term US treasury
bonds. Any upside shift in this price of risk series will result from US Treasury
bonds becoming expensive vis-à-vis US equities, which represents Flight to Safety.
Real policy rates are obtained by adjusting effective federal funds rates for the
rate of inflation. The surplus ratio is defined for this chapter1 as one minus ratio
1The later chapters, which feature an NK model with internal habits, define surplus ratio
differently as one minus ratio of subsistence habits to consumption. ?? on page ?? provides the
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of the sum of non-durable goods and services consumption to total consumption.
FTS shocks are identified by imposing orthogonality (or zero) restrictions between
Flight to Safety and generic business cycle disturbances. The latter are shocks
to the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series and are ordered first in
the five variable S-VAR. The fifth series that is ordered last in the S-VAR is a
business cycle variable of interest (such as output, hours or investment, etc.). No
restrictions are imposed on its impulse responses to any shocks in the model. In
this manner, the identification method remains agnostic for the key variable of
interest. Different sign restrictions, from the ones imposed to identify the FTS
shocks, are included to single out the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity
(TFP) shocks, and monetary policy (MP) shocks. These two disturbances are
also restricted as orthogonal to each other.
The identification strategy is designed to overcome many challenges that are
expected to arise in identifying the Flight to Safety shocks in vector autoregres-
sions. At first, there is confusion over what one means by Flight to Safety shocks.
There is no standard definition of the Flight to Safety phenomenon, and there is
no actual price of risk series from which we can extract Flight to Safety shocks.
The second concern is about the validity of the entire econometric procedure,
which relates to whether the shocks in the price of risk series are purely led from
a Flight to Safety (or Risk) motive or automatic movements resulting from other
demand, business cycle, or monetary policy shocks. The next concern is avoiding
the possibility that external shock impacts all variables in the model. Several
shocks come to mind, which could have effects similar to those of a business cycle
shock or a Flight to Safety shock. However, they result from sources exogenous
to the model, e.g., a labour supply shock in another sector, an oil price shock, a
fiscal policy shock. The fourth concern pertains to the choice of sign restrictions
imposed and the credibility of identifying assumptions employed in this study.
There may be agreement about some sign restrictions strategies, e.g., that positive
monetary policy shocks raise interest rates in the short run. However, competing
ideas come to mind when considering the impact of Flight to Safety on various
macroeconomic time series. Finally, one also needs to consider that this study’s
results represent the impact of the intended Flight to Safety shocks and are not
resulting from any other form of expectations, policy uncertainty, or sentiment
shocks in disguise.
The first concern can be addressed by arguing that Flight to Safety is a
phenomenon of forward looking expectations and that households prefer bonds
definitions for use in later chapters.
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or safer assets to equities or riskier assets to safeguard their portfolio against
expected loss of future income and wealth. By following this approach, we can
obtain a price of risk series from the difference between the price of safe securities,
which for this chapter is calculated by inverting the yield on 10-year US Treasury
bonds and the price of risky securities (or the S&P 500 index). This price of risk
series increases (or moves up) when investors favour safer investments (bonds)
more than riskier investments (equities).
Developing a price of risk series in this manner has a clear advantage over
other recent attempts in the literature to identify the incidence of Flight to Safety
using likelihood and kernel-based methods. For e.g. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht,
and Wei (2013 and 2019). The approach to developing the price of risk series
followed in this chapter provides a smooth trend stationary series suitable for
vector autoregressions. It can be replicated without relying on the researcher’s
inputs of the bandwidth and threshold criteria, as required in likelihood and
kernel-based methods. The Sensitivity analysis section compares the Flight to
Safety shocks obtained using methods of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei
(2019) with the Flight to Safety shocks obtained through S-VAR. These two
procedures’ key results are comparable, but working out a Flight to Safety series
through VAR offers ease of replication and universal appeal.
For addressing the second concern, the orthogonality restriction imposed be-
tween total factor productivity shocks and Flight to Safety shocks filters out the
possibility of automatic spillovers from business cycle surprises to Flight to Safety
shocks. Orthogonality restriction between total factor productivity shocks and
monetary policy shocks is also vital to keeping monetary shocks unrelated to
generic movements in business cycles.
The third concern is addressed by repeating this exercise for other macro
variables. The benchmark configuration’s key variable of interest in subsequent
experiments is replaced with other business cycle variables (such as hours, foreign
portfolio flows, consumer prices, etc.). The purpose of such an examination is
to seek common plausible explanations for changes in impulse responses between
the replacement model and the benchmark S-VAR model and to avoid missing
out on any explanatory contribution from common external factors.
The fourth concern is resolved by choosing policy-relevant and theoretically
robust signs and zero restrictions. The identifying assumptions are based on
the results of Smets and Wouters (2007). They consider a medium scale NK or
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NNS (New Neoclassical synthesis) model that is consistent with the balanced
steady-state growth path and is estimated using Bayesian methods. Their model
has 7 structural shocks in: total factor productivity, risk premium, investment
technology, wage, price markup, exogenous spending, and monetary policy. Sev-
eral features of their model such as labour augmenting technological progress,
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and real rigidity in
intermediate goods and labour market, make it a standard workhorse model of
monetary policy analysis and also make it relevant for obtaining economic the-
ory backed sign restrictions for total factor productivity, Flight to Safety and
monetary policy shocks for the analysis made in this chapter.
Some of the critical results from Smets and Wouters (2007) that are useful in
driving sign restrictions for this chapter are as follows. Technology shocks lead to
an increase in output and consumption but a small decrease in nominal and real
interest rates. On the initial impact, the fall in real rates is insufficient to prevent
a decline in inflation and opening up of the output gap. Flight to Safety shocks
restrictions in this chapter follow from risk premium shocks of Smets and Wouters
(2007) where these innovations result in a fall in output, hours, and an increase
in the real interest rate. One could argue that the risk premium shocks are not
the same as a Flight to Safety shocks. Nevertheless, suppose the increase in risk
premium is not uniform across investments of different risk profiles. In that case,
for this chapter and to generate comparable results with standard DSGE models,
it is within reason to characterize an increase in risk premium as a motivating
factor for investors’ preference for safety. The monetary policy shocks in that
model Smets and Wouters (2007) on impact lead to an increase in nominal and
real interest rates but a decrease in output, inflation, and hours. The monetary
policy shocks in S-VAR model of this chapter include similar restrictions.
The fifth and final concern is addressed in the robustness section, where results
from the economic policy uncertainty series [from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
and Bloom (2014)], corporate bonds spread, liquidity spread, investment-specific
technological productivity, and the relative price of the investment in terms of
consumption are included in the analysis. Their results depict a reasonable likeness
between the share of investment growth explained through Flight to Safety shocks
and other series that capture the phenomenon of Flight to Safety. The Granger
causality running from the price of risk series to these alternate series reaffirms
the notion that Flight to Safety plays a significant role in business cycles.
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The analysis contributes by motivating us to rethink about the role
played by Flight to Safety in the most severe US recession since the Great depres-
sion. This chapter’s empirical exercise extends research on Flight to Safety into
new directions in the following manner. Firstly, it explores the long and short-
run impact of Flight to Safety shocks on key macroeconomic variables through
a structural vector autoregression study where Flight to Safety and monetary
policy shocks are orthogonal to any business cycle shocks. The structural VAR
makes minimal assumptions about the existence of any prior ordering of struc-
tural shocks. Secondly, it evaluates the strength of results by comparing them
with the business cycle phenomenon in other sectors such as labour market and
investments and different periods such as the Great moderation period running
up to the global financial crisis and the pre-Great moderation period. Thirdly, it
evaluates the empirical exercise and identification strategy by obtaining compara-
ble results from series that, in principle, have similar impact phenomena as the
Flight to Safety. Some of the other asset market phenomena that coincide with
episodes of FTS are: an increase in policy uncertainty, a widening of yield spreads
between Baa and Aaa corporate bonds yields, an increase in liquidity spread
between the yields on long-term and short-term treasury bonds, and an increase
in the ratio of the price of investment goods to the price of consumption goods.
The Robustness section makes a comparison between each series’ business cycle
impacts with the results obtained from the FTS series. Fourthly, the analysis
brings to light the asymmetric economic impact of Flight to Safety and the capital
flight in the reverse direction, Flight to Risk. Lastly, it develops a Flight to Safety
shock series for the US economy that is intuitive and simple.
The contribution of results comes from providing a sound justification
and closure to the main objective of undertaking this study to estimate the
business cycle impact of FTS. Flight to Safety shocks significantly affect the
long-term dynamics of the business cycle and economic activity. The impact of
Flight to Safety shocks on the economy has increased in the post-Global financial
crisis period. Hours, output, consumption, and investments all display negative
responses to identified Flight to Safety shocks.
A one standard deviation Flight to Safety shock can account for a statistically
significant 3% decline in private investments and a 4% decline in residential in-
vestments over a couple of years. Identified FTS shocks also lead to an imminent
fall in total factor productivity by 8-10 quarters. Thus, they dispel the notion
that FTS shocks are a neutral TFP or investment related TFP shock in disguise.
FTS shocks also account for over sixty percent variation in relevant macroeco-
9
Figure 1: Contribution of FTS to Investment growth
Notes: Y-axis: Year on year growth rate (%) of US Investments and the benchmark
model fitted with only Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks identified using Sign and Zero
restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis label is Years (in YY format). Investment
- is the US investment data series (PInv). FTS shocks only - is the Investment series
in the benchmark model fitted with FTS shocks only.
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nomic variables (hours, output, consumption, and investments) at business cycle
frequencies, indicating that such shocks are an essential part of business cycles.
The identified Flight to Safety shocks can decompose most of the k-step ahead
forecast error variance in Investments in the benchmark VAR configuration. See
Figure 1 on page 9, which plots the year on year growth in the investment data
(dashed line) and the one that can be explained by only the Flight to Safety
shocks in the benchmark VAR model (solid line). The co-movement between the
two series is striking. In particular, during economic downturns such as previous
recessions of the 80s, 90s, the Dotcom bust, and the Global financial crisis, the
Flight to Safety shocks seem to be running the investment growth lower.
Besides FTS shocks, the benchmark model whose identification restrictions
we will discuss in later sections, has shocks in total factor productivity, monetary
policy, and consumer demand. Despite the presence of these other three keys
shocks such a significant contribution of the Flight to Safety shocks, signifying
that perceived risk aversion and precautionary motives manifested in Flight to
Safety have a more prominent role in developing our understanding of business
cycles. The significant contribution of FTS shocks to business cycles can be further
corroborated from the k-period ahead forecast error variance decomposition (from
Figure 2 on page 11) of crucial macro variables from identified Flight to Safety
shocks. The figure shows that FTS explains more the sixty percent of forecast
error variance in investment and a significant portion of it in other key macro
variables such as output, hours, CPI, and consumption at business cycle frequency
(8-32 quarters).
A breakdown of historical decomposition (Figure 3 on page 12) of the Invest-
ment series shows that FTS shocks were a significant driver of the increase in
private investments in the years 1994-2007 running up to the global financial
crisis. The significance of FTS shocks has been at its maximum during the period
following the global financial crisis. Post-2009, there is a sluggish response of
Investment series in the US due to negative FTS shocks hitting the economy. The
recovery period had a reduced incidence of FTS shocks, but only after 2015 did
we see any positive deviation from the Investment series trend.
An underlying expectation hypothesis that this vector autoregression
analysis could influence is that there are possibly two channels through which
Flight to Safety may be relevant to study investments and business cycles. Firstly,
Expectations channel, which explains Flight to Safety shocks as being caused
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Figure 2: FEVD (%) explained by FTS shocks
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Notes: The k-step ahead Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD %) explained
by FTS shocks, in the 5-variable VAR, which is identified using Sign and Zero restric-
tions Identification Strategy 1. The 5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP,
Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments.
In other iterations of the 5-variable model, ‘Investment’ is replaced with other macro
variables of interest. The result of ‘Investment’ and only those variables that replace
‘Investment’ in the benchmark VAR are reported.
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Figure 3: Historical Decomposition of Investments
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Notes : Historical Decomposition of Investment in VAR model Yt = [tfpt, Bond-
Equityt, real ratet, Surplus ratiot, Investmentt]′, which is identified using Sign
and Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis label: years.
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by a build-up of expectations of an impending deterioration in the economy
or an expected downturn in the business cycle. Flight to Safety is thus only
an indication of a negative total factor productivity shock expected to hit the
economy. Therefore, rational, forward-looking households respond in the short
run by moving investments from risky equities to safer bonds to safeguard their
portfolio against future expected loss of income and wealth.
A similar approach is followed in news shocks driven business cycle literature
[see Nam and Wang (2019), Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011), Beaudry and
Portier (2006) and (2014)] which postulates that cyclical fluctuations emerge when
economic agents update their expectations from news about future productivity.
Secondly, the Speculative channel, according to which investors and businesses
that have an understanding of the economy, pre-empt others by taking speculative
positions. A Flight to Safety shock then is an over-correction by speculators to
disappointing economic news. If enough speculators, investors, customers, and
entrepreneurs over-correct, they can engineer a crisis of its own. Put, as per the
expectations channel, Flight to Safety shock is a response to the expected future
state of the economy, whereas in line with the speculative channel, a Flight to
Safety shock results from an optimistic bet on the economy that turned-sour in
the current state. The technology used in the analysis in this chapter is neither
sufficient to identify the role of expectations, nor is it the central objective of this
study to identify such channels. Still, by looking at the VAR study’s evidence,
there is some inclination to favour the Expectations channel. Aligning the results
with estimation from a theoretical DSGE model could enhance our understanding
of these expectation channels.
This chapter contributes to growing macro-finance literature by
developing facts about the Flight to Safety mechanism and linking it with time-
varying risk aversion and precautionary savings motive of agents/investors and
financial intermediaries. The linkages between FTS mechanism and behavioural
features related to investments have not been included even in the following liter-
ature, which is considered seminal on Flight of Safety. Vayanos (2004) provides
a theoretical introduction to the FTS phenomenon in asset pricing literature.
Cochrane (2016, 2017) presents a macro-finance model that links changes in
investor excess consumption to Flight to Safety. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht,
and Wei (2019) and Baur and Lucey (2009) document the incidence of Flight to
Safety across major countries. And Boudry, Connolly, and Steiner (2019) pro-
vides impact of Flight to Safety on liquidity returns, revenues and valuation of
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the commercial real estate industry. The previous literature has also explored
the Flight to Safety mechanism in a limited way. Two common themes stand out.
First of all, it is to consider FTS as being generated through market imperfections
or externalities. These have been explored in the form of liquidity constraints [He
and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)], Knightian uncer-
tainty (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008), margin requirements of speculators
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008), and intermediary balance sheets (Adrian,
Boyarchenko, and Shachar, 2017). The second perspective is to consider FTS as
a short term asset market phenomenon. The kernel-based approach discussed in
Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) exemplies this perspective. It mea-
sures the likelihood of observing an FTS event. Either through a threshold-based
method that calculates how each trading day compares to the distribution of
return differential between bond minus equity returns. Alternatively, measuring
it by an ordinal index-based method ranks each trading day on how it complies
with the weak and strong symptoms attributed to an FTS day. This chapter relies
on a quarterly time series of equity index and government bond yields to identify
Flight to Safety shocks. It stays away from extreme but for short duration only
movements in volatility, asset prices, and other high-frequency variables. Work-
ing with high-frequency data (like Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013))
would not have answered one of the primary purposes of this study, which is to
evaluate the long-term impact of FTS. If an extreme flight of investment from
stocks to bonds over one week reverses in another week, that would leave the
aggregate investment allocation for the quarter as unchanged and, therefore, less
relevant for our macroeconomic analysis. The Flight to Safety shocks identified in
this chapter are robust to similar results from kernel-based methods of identifying
such shocks. However, compared to other approaches, the vector autoregressions
approach followed here has higher universal applicability.
This chapter pursues a novel approach to develop stylised facts about Flight
to Safety . I use agnostic identification which follows from Uhlig (2005) and Arias,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner (2018). The sign restrictions based identification,
building on the work of Canova and Nicoló (2002), Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005)
restricts the signs of specific impulse responses in the structural VAR, and without
undercutting scientific inquiry, it keeps them in line with tenable priors accepted
in theory. This strategy contributes to the literature by imposing minimal sign-
based restrictions on the structural VAR and not using the orthogonal ordering
approach. The latter assumes some macro variables as sluggish to react to shocks.
The identification in this chapter imposes no restrictions on the key business cycle
variable of interest.
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The success of an identification strategy depends on the plausibility of impulse
responses it generates. This chapter’s reasonable sign restrictions do not contra-
dict with established results from DSGE models (Smets and Wouters, 2007). This
impulse response-based identification strategy generates bounds on key variables
of interest responses to structural shocks in the VAR. The identification strategy
does not impose any sign restrictions on the key variables of interest, such as
Output, Investment, Consumption, Hours, Unemployment, Labour productiv-
ity, Residential Investment, Non-Residential Investment, Capital Expenditure,
R&D Expenditure, Consumer Prices, Government consumption and Expenditure,
Prices of Investment goods in terms of Consumption goods, Consumer Sentiment,
Capacity Utilisation, Vacancy rate, Participation rate, Foreign flows, and Wages.
So in words of Uhlig (2005), the business cycle variable of interest remains agnostic
to the identification. On the one hand, identifying FTS through S-VAR and sign
restrictions differs from the existing approach to address this topic. On the other
hand, this approach to study this phenomenon through vector autoregressions
has a universal appeal.
The primary motivation for looking at the FTS phenomenon and obtain-
ing its long term impact on the US macroeconomy comes from the unprecedented
nature of the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and its long-lasting impact on
consumption and investment data series. Compared to previous post-war reces-
sions, the US’s recovery following the global financial crisis has been muted and
unprecedented for many quarters. Investment per capita in the US (as shown
in Figure 4 on page 16), fell sharply after the Global financial crisis of 2008.
Similarly, Consumption of Non-durable goods and services2 was most distinctly
impacted by the global financial crisis than any previous post-war recession. This
series has been sluggish to return to its pre-crisis levels, as shown in the Figure 4
on page 16. During the global financial crisis, the performance was the worst
performance of Investment, Consumption of non-durable and services, and many
other macroeconomic aggregates in comparison to any post-war recession. The
global financial crisis also dampened business sentiment (as shown in Figure 5
on page 17), but intriguingly, the impact was not so severely different from other
previous recessions. Therefore sentiment alone cannot account for the signifi-
cant decline in macroeconomic aggregate variables (esp. Investments) during the
global financial crisis, and we have to look for alternate causes. This search for
alternative explanations for the GFC was one of the chief motivations behind
undertaking this study.
2For this chapter only, we can characterize this series as Consumption habits.
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Figure 4: Global financial crisis and US recessions
(a) Private Investment per capita
(b) Habits (Services and Non-Durables Consumption) per capita
Notes : Value at the peak of the each recession is indexed at 100, and corresponds
to 0 on the X-axis, which denotes the time period in quarters pre and post the peak
of a recession. The legend denotes peak to trough duration of a recession, for.eg.
07.IV-09.II is the peak to trough period 2007Q4-2009Q2 of the 2007-09 recession.
Source: US FRED, NBER
17
Figure 5: Identified FTS shocks and Business outlook index
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Notes: The figure shows Flight to Safety shocks (identified with restriction strategy 1)
to a 5-variable benchmark VAR model, for Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3. The correlation
between the two series is -52%. Two quarter average of identified FTS shocks (dashed,
right inverted axis), and 4 quarter average of the Philadelphia Fed Manufacturing
Business outlook survey (solid, left axis) are plotted.
This unprecedented impact of the global financial crisis on the macroeconomic
aggregates befits looking at explanations/mechanisms that could have been more
relevant in the recent crisis than in any previous ones. Therefore, the search
is for variables that had a somewhat more noticeable impact on the business
cycle during the global financial crisis than the impact they had on the macroe-
conomic aggregate variables in any other post-war recession. Figure 6 on page
19 and results of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) methods from
Appendix B show that the incidence of Flight to Safety has increased in the last
two decades, which makes it a phenomenon of significance in recent events and a
likely differential that could explain the impact of the global financial crisis.
Let us look at some anecdotal evidence that the identified FTS shocks from
the empirical study performed in this chapter, a 5-variable VAR with the sign
and zero restrictions, capture the changes in US Business conditions expectations.
The identified FTS shock series, as seen in Figure 5 on page 17, has a negative
52% correlation to US Philadelphia Fed Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey
(MBOS). The latter is an index tracking the direction of change in overall business
activity. This figure plots a cumulative sum of two-quarters of FTS shock on an
18 1. Introduction
inverted scale, i.e., the dips on the chart refer to Flight to Safety, and the peaks
are a shock in the reverse direction or a Flight to Risk. The two series closely track
each other; they slowly increase through the Dotcom period of the 90s, ending
with a bust in 2001. The housing sector bubble build-up in the 2000s, and the
recession of 2007-08 are also visible. Most importantly, the inverted cumulative
FTS shock has a peak to trough drop of near eight percentage points during 2007.
It marks the worst peak to trough for identified series in the tested period (1983
to 2019). However, the worst peak to trough drop of Business confidence series
during 2007 was similar to the one in the late 80s crisis. Monetary easing in the
1990s and 2000s was able to restore business confidence. However, we notice that
despite the unprecedented monetary policy response following the Lehman crisis,
there is a lack of recovery in business confidence, and it did not return to its
peak for nearly a decade. Therefore, reasons/factors that were not prevalent in
the 1980s were the main reason behind the dip in consumer sentiment during the
GFC. This supports our faith in the original expectation that the identified FTS
shocks from our VAR exercise, which have been unprecedented in times preceding
the GFC, capture the GFC’s driving mechanism, which was an unprecedented
post-war economic downturn.
This chapter takes a small step forward in emphasizing the Flight to Safety
and changes in investors’ risk aversion as variables on significance in the business
cycle. It would be interesting to see, in future research, if the findings of this
chapter are consistent with results from an estimated DSGE model or whether
there is a need to impose any additional restrictions based on general equilibrium
modeling to bolster this chapter’s findings further.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 2 makes a
brief discussion of related literature. Section 3 describes the data. It is followed
by a description of the benchmark 5 variable model’s identifying assumptions in
section 4. This section also discusses the theoretical and numerical algorithm for
sign and zero restriction identification employed in this chapter. Section 5 dis-
cusses the results from empirical analysis, their impact on business cycle variables,
the forecast-error variance, and brings to light the asymmetry between Flight
to Safety and Flight to Risk shocks. Section 6 performs sensitivity exercise on
the results. It also discusses the alternative identifications of Flight to Safety
shocks and their significance in various periods. Section 7 discusses the identified
FTS shocks with methods propounded in literature in explaining business cycle
fluctuations while section 8 concludes.
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Figure 6: Frequency and Likelihood of Flight to Safety days.
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Notes: Heatmap for frequency (freq) and aggregate likelihood (prob) of Flight to Safety (FTS)
days in each quarter from 1963 to 2019. FTS days are calculated by Ordinal index approach
(see Appendix B.3), for k = 1.25. Aggregated likelihood or strength of FTS, for each quarter
in the studied period is calculated by adding the likelihood for each FTS day during that
period.
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2 Literature review
This section discusses both theoretical and empirical research related to Flight
to Safety. In the wake of the global financial crisis, uncertainties about the
growth and economic outlook have led to many pronounced episodes of negative
correlation between returns on government bonds and stock returns. The returns
on government bonds (safe assets) were positive, while the stock returns (risky
asset) were negative. During such instances, there was also deterioration in market
liquidity and an increase in volatility (See Figure 7 on page 21). It is such episodes
that are commonly referred to as Flight to Safety (or FTS). However, the economic
literature also uses FTS as an inclusive term for two other phenomena, viz. Flight
to Quality (FTQ) and Flight to Liquidity (FTL), where the key difference between
these two terms results from the underlying preference (whether for liquidity or
quality) of investors that has motivated them to re-balance their portfolio from
risky to safe assets.
Precautionary motives and risk aversion
A typical FTS episode is signified by a sudden increase in appetite for safe
assets with respect to risky assets. The idea that during times of uncertainty,
economic agents change their behaviour, by exhibiting caution towards excessive
consumption and increase their savings, is quite old and one of the defining reasons
for the study of macroeconomics. Agents that are uncertain about their future in-
come and employment, exhibit precautionary behaviour to increase savings today
to smooth out their consumption path and ameliorate the impact of realisation of
a bad state in future. Modern understanding of the precautionary motives often
refers to discussion is Keynes (1936), however there is an even earlier precedent
in Marshall (1890), "The thriftlessness of early times was in great measure due to
the want of security that those who made provision for the future would enjoy it".
Theoretical macro-finance literature [pioneered by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997)], demonstrates the impact of small shocks on the macro economy. Persistent
effects from these shocks can permanently damage agents’ net worth through a
drop in prices of assets they hold. Moreover, it feeds into a feedback loop where
the fall in prices amplifies the initial mechanism and reduces agents’ net worth
even further.
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Figure 7: Conditional volatility in financial markets
Notes: Long run and Short run (right axis, in all charts) conditional volatility, cor-
relation and covariance for daily returns (%) of S&P 500 and US 10-year Treasury
bonds. The long run variances are calculated by using a backward looking kernel of
250 days, whereas short run variances are calculated by backward looking kernel of 5
days. See Appendix B.1 for a detailed methodology.
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A rise in precautionary motives and increased risk aversion reduce investment
demand and fuel deflationary pressure, which can be self-fulfilling. As per Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov (2014) when prices drop in a crisis due to higher expected
returns, agents hold on to cash for buying assets later at fire-sale prices, which
elongates periods of low growth and asset misallocation.
The theoretical asset pricing literature on investor related Flight to Safety is pi-
oneered by Vayanos (2004). In his model, fund managers face a funding constraint
in the form of the likelihood of withdrawal of managed funds by individuals that
are investing in these funds. The fund managers’ funding constraint depends on
the fund (i.e., whether it outperforms a threshold set by investors). This funding
constraint also evolves endogenously on the level of market liquidity and volatility.
During volatile times, there is an increase in probability with which the fund’s
performance could fall short of investors’ threshold set. In volatile periods, this
feature increases fund managers’ risk aversion and leads to a preference for more
liquid (FTL) and safer (FTS) assets.
Financial constraints based models in He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), show that the amplification from small shocks
grows for these financially constrained agents when their wealth is at a distance
from the steady-state. When the endogenous risk is driven by financial constraints
instead of being driven by fundamentals, it increases agents’ precautionary savings
motive. Precautionary demand and savings are shown to play an essential role
in other industries as well. Empirically Kilian (2009) decomposes oil prices and
addresses that from 1975-2007 precautionary demand shocks, which is uncertainty
about future supplies, had an immediate and persistent impact on oil prices.
Whereas during that period, the contribution to oil prices from disruptions due to
supply shocks had been often short lived, and contribution from global demand
shocks had been persistent but somewhat delayed.
Wealth preservation and liquidity preference are other two commonly studied
motives for FTS. Boucher and Tokpavi (2019) study whether (high or low) bond
yield environment affects the strength of these motivations. In their quantile
regression model, an environment of low bond yields, expansionary monetary
policy, and low inflation jeopardize the well-known diversification benefits of
holding US treasury bonds. There is a decrease in the traditional Flight to
Safety channel’s strength, i.e., switching investments from equity to bond. It gets
substituted by a pick up in the strength of Flight to Safety from equity to other
safe-haven assets viz. Gold, Japanese Yen (JPY) and Swiss Franc (CHF).
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The CAPM literature establishes FTS as the joint occurrence of higher eco-
nomic uncertainty, low cash flows, high risk premium, high precautionary savings
motive and low real rates. FTS episode in asset pricing literature results from
the precautionary response of investors to changes in economic conditions. When
uncertainty (quantity of risk) or stock market volatility increases, then the agents,
investment managers, speculators in asset pricing models become more risk-averse
and prefer safe and high-quality assets.
Liquidity, volatility and market externalities
There is a macro, asset pricing, and CAPM literature pattern that the Flight
to Safety mechanism is linked with precautionary behaviour and changes in risk
aversion of household/investor. But other theoretical studies have explored FTS
in relation to speculation, liquidity, and market volatility. Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) study the relation between liquidity shocks and adverse economic and
financial episodes. Illiquid securities in their results have a higher sensitivity to
market liquidity and market returns. Stocks with higher liquidity risk on average
command an additional 1.1% risk premium.
Previously observed episodes of Flight to Quality, including Penn central trans-
portation company default of 1970, Crash of 1987, Russian default, the Asian crisis,
Bailout of LTCM, and events following attacks of 9/11 were not just instances of
capital/liquidity shortages. These episodes also witnessed disengagement by in-
vestors from risky activities. In the words of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008),
these were instances of Knightian uncertainty or immeasurable risk. Their model
demonstrates that agents and intermediaries faced with an increase in Knightian
uncertainty or liquidity shortages give more consideration to the worst possible
outcomes. Such agents become self-protective and conservative in the allocation
of risk capital, thus rendering capital markets inflexible. A resolution to this
situation exists in the form of a massive policy involvement from the government
acting as lender of last resort and transferring some of its collateral, trust, and
liquidity to the distressed capital market (Caballero and Kurlat, 2009).
Speculators during FTS suffer from the destabilizing effect of margin require-
ments (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). When speculators’ funding liquidity
is tight and has higher margin requirements, they provide more liquidity for
assets with low margin requirements (and are safer). This generates FTS and
co-movement of risk premiums in capital markets. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2008), high market volatility creates a differential between the liquidity of safe
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and risky stocks. In other related studies, there is a deterioration of aggregate
liquidity due to either lower net worth of intermediaries (Adrian and Shin, 2010),
or effect of regulation on intermediary balance sheets (Adrian, Boyarchenko, and
Shachar, 2017), or dynamic adverse selection (Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014). When
combined with uncertainty averse behaviour of agents, any of these could lead to
portfolio reallocation from risky to safe assets, or FTS.
The empirical literature mainly studies the FTS as a high-frequency event
and focuses on its impact on returns, liquidity and volatility of the asset markets
(Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2016). The distinction between
liquidity profile of corporate bonds impacts the way different bonds react to FTS
(Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath, 2013). There is a notable reduction in illiquid
or stress regimes’ asset prices, particularly for less liquid assets. The prices for
investment-grade US corporate bonds are less affected than those of speculative
(junk) grade bonds. A similar effect is visible in stocks with low book-to-market
value ratio.
Baur and Lucey (2009) find that FTS episodes are a regular occurrence in crisis
periods and show contagion for eight developed countries that they study. FTS
demonstrates the resilience and diversification benefits of financial markets for
investors, as it shows that there is an asset class that can absorb excess capital in
times of crisis. Markets lacking an FTS absorbing asset class suffer more significant
losses and are less resilient in a crisis period. Using daily data for 23 countries,
Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) further provide some stylized impact
of FTS. FTS phenomenon coincides with an increase in the Volatility Index (VIX),
a decrease in consumer sentiment, a higher preference for holding safe-haven assets
(Gold) and currencies (Japanese Yen JPY, and Swiss Franc CHF), and a rise in
the TED spread, which is the difference between the 3-month Treasury bill and
the 3-month US dollar LIBOR. Boudry, Connolly, and Steiner (2019) provide
the impact of FTS on high-frequency responses such as short-term liquidity and
returns, and the low-frequency response variables such as long term revenues and
valuation, of the commercial real estate industry. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
demonstrate that individual investors do not depict any portfolio reallocation
towards more risky assets as their wealth increases; instead, they re-balance slowly
following capital gains/losses. The regression of daily returns of Gold prices on
stock and bond returns of UK, US, and German markets, in Baur and Lucey
(2010) demonstrates that Gold has short-lived safe haven (safer asset) properties
during extreme stock market events. Whereas in normal times, Gold is a hedge
(uncorrelated) to stock markets.
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Sign restrictions and expectations dynamics
Cochrane (2017) finds that changes in economic fundamentals lead to FTS,
and it has a long-run impact on the asset valuations and macroeconomic variables.
Despite that, there is no empirical study explaining the impact of FTS on short
and long-term fundamentals of the economy. One possible reason for this could
be the difficulty in separating the endogeneity of business cycles to FTS. Boucher
and Tokpavi (2019), is a notable exception, as they find that the strength of FTS
from stocks to bonds weakens as the interest rate on government bond maturities
fall towards ZLB. They highlight the endogenous mechanism, which translates
the state of the business cycle and the level of interest rates to the strength and
likelihood of the FTS. In their analysis, during a low yield environment, the FTS
from stock to bond is substituted by the FTS from stock to other safe-haven assets
such as Gold and Swiss Franc. In comparison, this chapter aims to understand
both the long and short-term impact of FTS on the macroeconomy, especially the
short and long-term impact of FTS episodes on depressing private investments,
including residential and non-residential investments, in the US economy.
The sign restrictions based identification used in this paper also complements
with significant empirical work done using sign restrictions in identifying the
impact of macroeconomic shocks in explaining the business cycles. Previous
research has used sign restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks (Uhlig,
2005), government spending shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009), financial shocks
[Hristov, Hülsewig, and Wollmershäuser (2012), Gambetti and Musso (2017)],
oil price shocks [Baumeister and Peersman (2013), Kilian and Murphy (2012)],
technology shocks [Dedola and Neri (2007) and Peersman and Straub (2009)],
uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2014), changes in the volatility from monetary policy
shocks (Theodoridis and Mumtaz, 2015), financial and uncertainty shocks (Cal-
dara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakrajšek, 2016), news shocks [Beaudry and
Portier (2006), Barsky and E. R. Sims (2011), Beaudry and Portier (2014)], and
mood swings [Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) and Nam and Wang (2019)].
Sign based identifying restrictions command an active space in empirical re-
search and has kept pace with new techniques, such as using agnostic priors (Arias,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner, 2018) and in combination with Bayesian FAVARs
(Ahmadi and Uhlig, 2015). Sign restrictions have been useful in enhancing our
understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their propagation, and this paper
contributes to its growing arsenal.
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A related view of this chapter’s risk-driven business cycle hypothesis is the
news-driven business cycle hypothesis (Beaudry and Portier, 2006), which posits
that booms and bust cycles can arise from better or worse expectations about
future fundamentals. According to the news-driven business cycles hypothesis,
favourable news about future factor productivity can ignite a boom today via
creating an incentive to accumulate and install new capital for future demand. In
contrast, a less than expected realization of total factor productivity today could
lead to bust even without any actual fall in total factor productivity or changes
in fundamentals.
The empirical evidence supported in VAR based identification schemes in
[Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Beaudry, Dupaigne, and Portier (2011)] backs
this claim, and noise shocks, i.e., misinformation about future total factor produc-
tivity, are related to positive co-movement in macroeconomic aggregates observed
in data. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) provides an alternate viewpoint that pos-
itive news may reduce the incentive to accumulate capital and instead favour
an increase in utilization of capital. Increased capacity utilization in itself leads
to a boom. However, the news-driven hypothesis is questioned under a differ-
ent identification scheme (Barsky and E. R. Sims, 2011). The impact of noise
shocks is similar to that of a standard DSGE model. A better than expected
total factor productivity leads to an increase in consumption but a decline in
output, hours, and investment. The VAR-based evidence of news based literature
is criticized (Arias, Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner, 2018) for its non-fundamental,
non-invertibility, the sensitivity of cointegration assumptions, and choice of vari-
ables in the system. If stock prices are not included in the system, the results do
not confirm news shock driven business cycles.
This chapter proposes another view to this debate that it is not noise shocks
to news about future total factor productivity. Instead, investor risk aversion
shocks lead to booms and busts in the business cycles. The Flight to Safety shocks
identified in this analysis lead expectation formation and TFP changes by much
longer periods than postulated by either news shocks or uncertainty shocks. The
macroeconomic theory-based identification employed in the benchmark analysis
is robust to alterations in sign restrictions. The fact that other time series can
account for the Flight to Safety phenomenon can also produce results comparable
to the benchmark analysis, reassuring our faith in this analysis’s results. The
significant results are not entirely dependent on the inclusion of the singular price
of risk series. In this manner, we avoid some criticism levied on the replicability
of news shocks results with other series. Moreover, it appeals to the universality
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of the cyclical risk aversion phenomenon captured in Flight to Safety.
As global financial markets have grown increasingly more interconnected, the
last couple of decades have seen FTS episodes (See figures 26 and 27 in Appendix
B.3) occurring more frequently and commonly around the world. Baele, Bekaert,
Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) report 2.7% FTS days in the US, and similar
instances of FTS in 23 other countries.
Economic literature witnessed an increase of interest in the phenomenon of
Flight to Safety. However, it is still fledgling, and its stylized facts are being
developed. More importantly, there is a lack of understanding about how Flight
to Safety shocks would work in the context of standard business cycle models.
This chapter embarks on a step in this direction by attempting to identify Flight
to Safety shocks and their business cycle impact.
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Table 1: Data series used in VAR models
Series Source Code Definition
Output GDP Gross domestic product
Disp. Income DPIC Disposable Personal Income
Consumption PCEC Personal Consumption Expenditures
Durable PCDG PCEC: Durable Goods
Non-Durable PCND PCEC: Non durable Goods
Services PCESV PCEC: Services
Investment GPDI Gross Private Domestic Investment
Res Investment PRFI Private Res. Fixed investment
Non-Res Investment PNFI Private Non-Res. Fixed investment
Gov CI GCE Govt. Consumption Exp. & Gross In-
vestment
Policy rate FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate
CPI CUSR0000SA0 Consumer prices - Urban
Participation CIVPART Labour force participation ratio
Vacancy rate composite HWI Help-Wanted Index
∗
Unemployment rate UNEMP Unemployment rate
Wages per hour A576RC1TOTLQ
Compensation
Hours from Non-farm payrolls
Hours NFBUS PNFS (excl. nonprofit): Hours
Employees NFBUS PNFS (excl. nonprofit): Employees
TFP dtfp_util Utilisation-adj TFP
#
TFP(EqDur) dtfp_I _util Utilisation-adj TFP Equipment and
Durables
#
Rel. px Cons to Equ relativePrice Rel. price Consumption to Equipment
Disp Inc / capita A229RC0Q0-
52SBEA
Disposable Income per capita
Capex BOGZ1FA38-
5050005Q
Capex Domestic non-fin. sectors
Capacity Util TCU Capacity Utilisation: Total industry
R&D expenditure Y694RC1Q0-
27SBEA
GDP: Research and Development
Foreign portfol. flows Equity & Debt Cumulative flows (+ inflow, - outflow)
Uncertainty EPU Economic policy Uncertainty
§
Inv share invShare Equipment and Cons Dur share of out-
put
Cons.Sentiment UMCSENT Consumer sentiment index
Term spread DGS10, DGS1 10 year and 1 year Treasury bond
Corp bond spread DBAA_AAA Baa minus Aaa yield
Equity ĜSPC S&P 500 Index
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Series Source Code Definition
Deflator DPCERD3Q0-
86SBEA
PCEC (implicit price deflator)
Investment deflator A006RD3Q0-
86SBEA
GPDI deflator
Non Durables deflator DNDGRD3Q0-
86SBEA
Non-durables cons deflator
Durables deflator DDURRD3Q0-
86SBEA
Durables cons deflator
Services deflator DSERRD3Q0-
86SBEA
Services deflator
∗
Barnichon (2010)
#
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
§
Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016)
Sources: US FRED, BEA, BLS, IMF, Univ of Michigan, Datastream, FRBSF, Yahoo!
Finance
3 Data
The source, purpose and definition of US data series that are considered in this
empirical exercise are described in Table 1 on page 28, while Figure 28 on page
121 hosts the logarithmic time series plots of those data series.
This empirical study investigates the role of Flight to Safety or Flight to
Risk shocks on the business cycle in the US from 1983 Q1 to 2019 Q3. The
selected period includes the Great moderation period 1983-2007, which in the
macroeconomic history witnessed a reduction in business cycle fluctuations in
the developed world, esp. the US. The selection of the beginning date (the year
1983) for the data is made to ignore the impact of Oil shocks in the 1970s and
the subsequent change in the Fed’s monetary policy stance and communication
strategy. The data also accounts for the global financial crisis period and the
subsequent recovery period from 2009 to 2019.
The macro time series are obtained from US FRED database of the Federal
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Reserve bank of St. Louis. Long-run macroeconomic data studied in this chapter
(as produced in Table 1 on page 28) are the fundamental series that represent the
long term macro-economic health of the US economy at any point in time. These
are relevant to our research question of decoding the short and long-run impact
of Flight to Safety shocks and Flight to Risk shocks on business cycles.
The empirical analysis is conducted through five variable vector autoregres-
sions, of which the first four key variables are: Total factor productivity, Price
of risk (bond minus stock prices), Real rates and Surplus ratio, and the fifth
variable is the variable of interest. In the benchmark configuration the variable
of interest is Investments. The variable of interest in subsequent iterations of
the VAR model is changed to one of the following variables of interest: Hours
(total), Output, Disposable Income, Term spread (or difference between 1-year
and 10-year T-bill rate), Consumer prices Consumption (Total) and Consumption
(only of Non-Durable goods consumption and Services consumption) which for
this chapter only is also defined as Consumption Habits.
The series on total factor productivity (tfp) is adjusted for factor-utilisation
using Fernald (2012), which follows Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and its
updated version in (Basu, Fernald, Fisher, and Kimball, 2013) with the pur-
pose to create quarterly growth-accounting database for the US business sectors3
Utilization adjusted tfp series is a better approximation of true technological
progress and has been previously used to identify the impact of news and expec-
tations shocks (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009). This source also provides for the
relative share of investment to output (invshare), the relative price of Consump-
tion to equipment (pxceq), and the utilization adjusted tfp series for equipment
and durables(TFP(EqDur)). All of which are considered in the sensitivity and
discussion sections of this chapter.
The difference between log of bond prices and the log of equity prices is
considered for series on Price of risk. An increase over time in the price of bond
minus the price of equity signifies consumers’ preference for safer asset vis-a-vis
risky asset. Therefore identified positive shocks to this series are characterized as
Flight to Safety shocks while identified adverse shocks to this series are Flight to
Risk shocks.
3See Fernald’s website, US Fred pages for data and comparable series of total factor produc-
tivity John G. Fernald. A Quarterly, Utilisation-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity.
Working Paper Series 2012-19. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Apr. 2012. eprint:
https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2012/19/.
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There are two ways in which we can get the price of equity, or the risky asset,
first, by merely using S&P 500 Composite Index. The data on the adjusted closing
price of S&P 500 Composite Index is sourced from Yahoo! finance (series ĜSPC).
An alternate way to construct relative price for risk is to consider the 10-year
P/E (price to earnings) ratio of S&P 500, which is available on Robert Schiller’s
webpage4, and use it deduce a ten years earnings yield for S&P 500. Consider this
earning yield of S&P 500 as a yield to maturity of a 10-year S&P 500 index and
use it to reverse engineer the price for Risky asset (S&P). US 10-year Treasury
bond is considered a safe asset, and the data for 10-year nominal bond yield to
maturity is sourced from US FRED database (series DGS10). The price for safe
asset (10-year T-Bond) is reverse calculated from its yield to maturity.
By taking the difference of log series of nominal bond prices and the log of S&P
prices (either through the index value or through 10-year price to earnings yield),
a series for Price of risk can be generated. The former approach is considered in
the benchmark VAR, but results are not sensitive to the latter approach as well.
Both the bond price and equity price series are nominal in denomination, which
means that their difference series is real and does not need any further adjustment
for Consumer Prices.
The ex-post real rate of return is given by the Federal funds (nominal) rate
minus the US all Urban consumers (indexed 2012 = 100) inflation rate. The
term spread is calculated by taking the difference between US 1-year and US
10-year yield, while corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) is sourced from Moody’s.
The surplus ratio is a series developed by considering One minus the ratio of
Non-durable and Services consumption to total Consumption.
Surplus Ratio =
ConsumptionT otal − ConsumptionNonDurables+Services
ConsumptionT otal
(1)
Non-Durable and Services consumption has been considered by many as a measure
of consumption habits and as a measure of permanent consumption [See for e.g.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and
Cochrane (2017)]. Consumption habits series is developed by adding up personal
consumption expenditure on non-durables (PCND) and personal consumption
expenditure on services (PCESV) series from the BEA. The ratio of consumption
habits to total consumption is a proportion of total consumption that satiates
the household’s habits or permanent level of consumption. One minus this ratio
describes the proportion of consumption in excess of the habits or permanent
4http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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consumption level. The literature on cyclical risk aversion considers the Surplus
ratio as the key component of the household’s utility (De Paoli and Zabczyk,
2013). The household feels a tighter pinch, or marginal utility of consumption
increases when the excess consumption gets closer to its long-term sustainable part
[Cochrane (2017), De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)]. The results of benchmark 5 VAR
model are not sensitive to replacing the Surplus Ratio with Total Consumption.
The other series which replace the key variable of interest in the benchmark
VAR are also taken from the US FRED database. The nominal series on Con-
sumption is the real personal consumption expenditure (PCEC) from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Durables consumption represents the personal con-
sumption expenditure on Durable goods (PCDG) series of the BEA. Nominal
output is measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the BEA.
To further investigate the behaviour of the investments sector, this chapter
also considers the following variables of interest: Durable goods consumption,
Residential investment, Non-residential investment, Research and Development
expenditure, Capital Expenditure, Price of Investment in terms of Price of Con-
sumption and the Price of Investment and Consumption of Durable goods in terms
of Price of Consumption habits (i.e., non-Durables consumption and services).
The nominal series on Investments is given by Gross private domestic invest-
ment (GPDI), the non-residential investment is represented by Private Nonres-
idential Fixed Investment (PNFI), and the series on Residential investment is
Private Residential Fixed Investment (PRFI). The GDP Research and Develop-
ment expenditure by BEA (Y694RC1Q027SBEA) is used for the R&D series.
The above described nominal data series are converted into real data series by
deflating using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) based implicit price
deflator (DPCERD, indexed 2012=100). All the above variables are divided by
population, which is reverse calculated from the Disposable income (DPI) and
Disposable income per capita series (A229RC0Q052SBEA) of the BEA, to get
respective real per-capita series that are used in the empirical analysis of this
chapter. The relative price ratio of investment to consumption is calculated by
using respective implicit price deflators (indexed 2012=100). Similarly, the ratio
of the sum of deflators for investment and durables consumption to the sum of
deflators for non-durables consumption and services gives the relative price of
investment and durables.
The business cycle analysis also considers the insights of labour market vari-
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ables: Hours (per worker), Output per labour (labour productivity), Labour force
participation rate, Unemployment rate, Vacancy rate, and Vacancy to Unem-
ployment ratio. Some other variables considered for robustness are consumer
sentiment, capacity utilization, and Foreign portfolio flows.
Labour market indicators of Hours (total) and Hours per employee are taken
from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). Total hours are measured by the hours
of all non-farm businesses in the BLS data. Hours per employee are calculated by
dividing total hours by the total non-farm business Sector employees. Real wages
per hour are generated by deflating the Total Compensation of Employees (Wage
and Salary Disbursements) personal income and outlays data (A576RC1) of BEA
with the PCE deflator and dividing it by the total number of hours of employees on
from non-farm payrolls, from BLS. Labour productivity is calculated by dividing
real GDP with total hours. Labour force participation rate (CIVPART) and
Unemployment rate series are from the BLS. The Government expenditure is
Government consumption expenditure and gross investment (GCE1) data from
the BEA and is deflated using the PCE implicit price deflator and divided by
population to derive the Government expenditure per capita series of the empirical
analysis. Quarterly data on Vacancy rate is from monthly Help-Wanted Index5
(Barnichon, 2010).
Some other important sub-index series are considered in the empirical analysis.
This includes the Total Industry Percent of Capacity Utilisation (TCU) series from
the BEA, which is used for the Capacity Utilisation series. Capital expenditures
for Domestic non-financial sectors from BEA (BOGZ1FA385050005Q) are used to
develop the Capital Expenditure series. The economic policy uncertainty series
constructed in (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016) is used as a measure of policy
uncertainty. Consumer surveys about consumer sentiment available for a long
history from the University of Michigan are included in the analysis. The next
challenge is to devise an identification scheme to overcome the endogeneity in
macroeconomic variables and other shocks that generate FTS behaviour. We
answer these questions by isolating the business cycle and monetary policy shocks
and only considering the FTS shocks that are orthogonal.
5Constructed in ‘Building a composite Help-Wanted Index’ Regis Barnichon. “Building
a composite Help-Wanted Index”. In: Economics Letters 109.3 (2010), pp. 175–178.
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4 Empirical analysis
This section describes the sign restrictions methodology that is adopted in this
chapter to identify Flight to Safety shocks in the US. Sign and zero restrictions are
derived from Uhlig’s agnostic identification (Uhlig, 2005) and the methodology
below is also supported by additional derivations presented in Appendix A. After
describing the identification methodology, the section also presents the identifying
assumptions and the theoretical rationale behind choosing them.
4.1 Methodology for identifying Flight to Safety shocks
The reduced form VAR and Uhlig’s agnostic identification: Consider a VAR model
in reduced form as in Uhlig (2005)
Yt = ct +
p
∑
k=1
B(k)Yt−k + ut (2)
where Yt is an m x 1 vector of endogenous variables, at date t = 1, ......T , B(k) are
reduced-form square coefficient matrices of size m x m and ut is m x 1 one-step
prediction error with m x m variance-covariance matrix Σu. This reduced form
VAR has a moving-average representation,
Yt = ct +
∞
∑
h=0
Φ(h)ut−h (3)
where Φ(0) = Im. For simplification we can ignore the ct term which comprises
of intercept and/or time trend. This is mostly an agreeable representation of
the reduced form VAR. The challenge in identification lies on how we decompose
the forecast error ut. If we assume that there are m fundamental, mutually
independent innovations, i.e. one shock for each endogenous variable, which are
normalised to be of variance 1. They can be represented by a m x 1 vector v such
that
E[vv′] = Σv = Im. (4)
The identification problem is then restricted to finding a linear mapping between
reduced form innovations ut and structural shocks vt. The mapping is represented
by an unknown matrix A such that
ut = Avt (5)
4.1 Methodology for identifying Flight to Safety shocks 35
The jth column of A represents the impact on all variables of VAR of the jth fun-
damental innovation. However identifying such an A matrix is not straightforward
as the variance-covariance matrix of ut which now can be written as
Σu = E[uu
′] = AE[vv′]A′ = AA′ (6)
also holds true for Ã which is any arbitrary orthogonalisation of Σv . For instance
consider a Cholesky decomposition of Σv = ÃÃ′ and some orthonormal matrix
P such that
A = ÃP (7)
AA
′ = ÃPP ′Ã′ = ÃÃ′ (8)
Therefore the identification of the structural shocks vt requires us to pin down
the orthonormal matrix P , which means there are another m(m − 1)/2 restric-
tions required to achieve this identification. Commonly used procedures in this
identification are recursive ordering of variables (C. A. Sims, 1986), breakup of
components into transitory or permanent (Blanchard and Quah, 1989), struc-
tural relations between fundamental innovations and prediction errors (Bernanke
and Mihov, 1998), and sign restrictions [Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009)]. I use Uhlig (2005) sign-restriction based agnostic identification method
to find the effects of FTS on the economy. A clear advantage of the approach is
that sign-restriction limits identification exercise to only k shocks of interest, and
the other m − k fundamental innovations can be ignored. By not imposing any
sign restrictions on the response of variables of interest, the procedure remains
‘agnostic’ (in the manner of Uhlig, 2005) with regards to these variables and can
be used in finding the effect of shocks on such variables. Following from the
equations (3) to (8) we can deduce the structural VAR in moving average form as
Yt = ct +
∞
∑
h=0
Ψ(h)vt−h (9)
where Ψ(h) = B(h)P , B(h) = Φ(h)Ã and vt−h are the structural shocks. The
impulse response of jth shock at horizon h ∈ h−, ..., h+ is given by the jth column
Ψ
j
(h) of matrix Ψ(h):
Ψ
j
(h) = B(h)p
j (10)
where pj is the jth column of P . The response of the ith element of the system
is thus given by the ith element on the impulse response vector
Ψ
i,j
(h) = B
i,
(h)p
j (11)
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B
i,
(h) is the ith row of B(h) and p
j is the jth column of P . Thus sign and zero
restrictions can be applied to response Ψi,j(h) for some horizons h to identify any
jth structural shock. It follows from Uhlig (2005) that the problem comes down
to identifying the unit vector pj which comes closest to meeting the sign and zero
restrictions (See Appendix A).
The identification can be achieved by either selecting from Markov chain Monte
carlo (MCMC) simulation a certain number of impulse responses that meet our
pre-determined sign restrictions or by choosing a Penalty (or criterion) function
Θ(p) which increases in the size of violation by impulse response to the selected
sign and zero restrictions. For ease of notation I am dropping the j superscript
in the equations that follow from here on. As discussed in Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), in the Penalty function approach, selecting between sign restrictions then
becomes a minimisation problem that solves,
p∗ = argmin
p
Θ(p) s.t. p′p = 1, (12)
for the Penalty function,
Θ(p) =
∑
i∈i+
h+
∑
h=h−
f

−
B
i,
(h)p
j
σi

+
∑
i∈i−
h+
∑
h=h−
f


B
i,
(h)p
j
σi

 (13)
where i+ is the set of variables whose impulse responses Bi,(h)p
j are set to be
positive and i− is the set of variables whose impulse responses are set to be
negative for the horizon h ∈ h−, ..., h+. Any zero restrictions on impact of the
variable ordered zth in the VAR system, can be included in the minimisation
problem by adding an additional constraint on the unit vector p as:
p∗ = argmin
p
Θ(p) s.t. p′p = 1 and Rzerop = 0 (14)
where Rzero is zth row of B(0), i.e. Rzero = B
z,
(0). The minimisation is solved in
Matlab using Simplex and inbuilt methods, and the estimation is conducted using
Bayesian procedures as in Uhlig (2005).
The algorithm for both MCMC and Penalty based methods is thus given by:
1. Draw from Normal-Wishart prior.
2.a. For a given draw either solve (14) to get a candidate solution for p∗ , or
2.b. Apply the stereographic inversion on the candidate solution to solve other
constraints, i.e. unit length and meeting Zero restrictions.
3. Obtain statistical inference on the basis of draws that solve step 2.
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Table 2: Identification restrictions in S-VAR
variables TFP Price of Real rate Surplus Variable of
shocks Risk ratio interest
Strategy 1
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + + − .
Monetary policy 0 . + − .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Strategy 2
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + + 0 .
Monetary policy 0 . + 0 .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Strategy 3
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + . 0 .
Monetary policy 0 . + 0 .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Notes: The benchmark VAR has 5 variables: TFP, Price of risk (which is
Bond price minus Equity price), Real rate, Surplus ratio (which is One minus
the ratio of Consumption of services and Non-durables to Total consump-
tion), and a variable of interest which in the benchmark case is Investments
but is replaced in different iterations by other business cycle variables for e.g.
Output, Consumption, Hours, CPI etc. On impact of the respective shock,
+ means the variable is restricted to be positive and − means that the vari-
able is restricted to be negative for the impact horizon. The impact horizon
is shock period plus one more period. Symbol 0 signifies a zero restriction
when the response variable is restricted to not respond to the shock contem-
poraneously, and Dots . signify that the impact response of that variable is
left unrestricted.
38 4. Empirical analysis
4.2 Sign and Zero restrictions based identification
The benchmark 5-variable VAR model consists of: Utilisation-adjusted Total
factor productivity, Price of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio and the variable of
interest which in the benchmark configuration is Investments. In other iterations
of the model the variable of interest is replaced by: Hours, Output, Consumption,
Disposable income, Term spread between 1-year and 10-year T-Bill rate, CPI and
Habits. Residential investments, Non-residential Investments, Disposable income,
Wages (per hour), consumption of non-durables and services, Foreign portfolio
flows, Government expenditure, Labour productivity. The structural model is
given by:
Yt = ct + B(0)pvt + B(1)pvt−1 + ...+ B(∞)pvt−∞ (15)
where
Yt =











TFP,
Price of risk,
Real rate,
Surplus ratio,
Investment











(16)
and
vt =











TFP shock,
FTS shock,
Policy shock,
Demand shock,
Residual shock











(17)
Three different identification strategies are adopted (See Table 2 on page 37) for
considering impact, impulse response restrictions from FTS shock on the first 3 or
4 variables of the benchmark 5 variable VAR. The impulse responses from the 5th
variable or the variable of interest in all strategies are left unrestricted. In this
manner, the impact analysis is agnostic to the effect on the variable of interest.
The identification strategies (in Table 2) are a set of sign and zero restrictions that
are supported by theoretical models of the business cycles and by observations
from data.
A prominent model that has been used in deriving sign restrictions in this
chapter is the NK (New Keynesian) or NNS (New Neoclassical synthesis) Smets
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and Wouters (2007) model that is consistent with the balanced steady state
growth path and is estimated by them using Bayesian methods. Their model has
7 orthogonal structural shocks in: total factor productivity, risk premium shocks,
investment technology shocks, wage shocks, price markup shocks, exogenous
spending (policy) shocks, and monetary policy shocks. It also incorporates many
relevant policy analysis features, such as labour augmented technological progress,
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and real rigidity in
intermediate goods and labor markets.
Several other interesting features of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model
are as follows. Household chooses over consumption and labour effort. Labour is
differentiated by a union, which gives monopoly power over determination of wages,
which are Calvo-style sticky. Consumption habits are exogenous. Households
make decisions to rent and accumulate capital based on the rental rate and
capital adjustment costs. Firms decide on producing differentiated products and
set prices based on present and expected marginal costs (wages and rental rate
of capital), and past and expected inflation. Wages depend on past wages and
future inflation. The medium-scale of this model, its micro-theoretic foundations
and relevance of the variables it considers with the business cycle phenomenon,
all together make it a standard workhorse model of monetary policy analysis and
a reliable resource to base the identifying restrictions of the empirical study of
this chapter.
The results of Smets and Wouters (2007) are consistent with the great modera-
tion period 1984 to 2004 and demonstrate a fall in the volatility of shocks (related
to total factor productivity, monetary policy, and price markup), the volatility of
output growth and inflation, and the sensitivity of response of output variables to
monetary policy shocks. They also show that during the great moderation, the
monetary policy response to output changes has slowed. The reaction of policy to
inflation has slightly increased, but the output gap’s reaction has reduced by half.
The sensitivity of their results to investment adjustment costs and consumption
habits is high. Investment shocks result in the hump-shaped responses in output,
hours, inflation, and interest rates.
The sign restrictions in this paper are based on the key results of Smets and
Wouters (2007). In particular that technology shocks lead to a fall in nominal and
real interest rates. However, for the monetary policy reaction function that they
estimate, this fall is not sufficient to prevent a drop in inflation and an opening
of the output gap. Risk premium shocks result in a fall in output, hours, and an
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increase in the real interest rate. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks lead to
an increase in interest rate, real interest rate but decrease output, inflation, and
hours. The sign restrictions are applied for a horizon of shock period and the next
period, while the zero restrictions are applied for the shock period itself. These
restrictions are represented in the B(0) and B(1) matrices, which are discussed
next for the three different identification strategies.
4.2.1 Identification strategy 1
Identification strategy 1 (See Table 2 on page 37), applies zero impact restriction
on TFP from monetary policy shock and Flight to Safety shock. Recall, that
the ordering of the 5 variable VAR in benchmark configuration is: TFP, Price
of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio and Investment. Therefore on applying the zero
restrictions the impact matrix B(0) becomes
B(0) =











. 0 0 . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .











(18)
where dots (.) symbolise entries that remain unrestricted. On including sign
restrictions given in Identification strategy 1 (see Table 2 on page 37) the B(0)
and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =











+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ − − . .
. . . . .











and B(1) =











+ . . . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ − − . .
. . . . .











(19)
The sign restrictions in 5 variable VAR are implemented for a maximum horizon
of one period after the shock, i.e. the restrictions are valid for the shock period
and one period after. Any zero restrictions are imposed only on the impact period.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to TFP shock In the 5 variable
benchmark VAR model, Identification strategy 1 imposes negative sign restrictions
from TFP shock (the first shock in VAR) on Real rates (the third variable in VAR)
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and imposes a positive restriction on Surplus ratio (the fourth variable in VAR).
In models of business cycle, an increase in technological progress is expected
to increase the household’s desire for consumption and leisure. If we assume
that consumption habits are slow to change, then it follows that an increase
household’s discretionary consumption would raise the surplus consumption and
the surplus ratio. However, the impact of real rates from a TFP shock is not that
unambiguous. A positive TFP shock leads to decrease in real interest rate. This
is consistent with the logic of standard Euler equation, where the current period
real interest rates is inversely related to current consumption. For the policy
maker with a dual mandate of price and output stability, in standard forward
looking 3-equation New Keynesian (NK) model6, it is optimal to consistently set
interest rates equal to natural rate of interest. Therefore a TFP shock in models
of price-rigidity warrants a cut in real rates to keep the output gap closed.
The literature based evidence points to a fall in natural rate of interest with
increases in total factor productivity (Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis,
and Villegas-Sanchez, 2017). But this causality is believed to run both ways, and
low real rate through its effect on resource allocation affects TFP growth that
drives natural rate lower (Cette, Fernald, and Mojon, 2016). Following from the
work of Smets and Wouters (2007), in the identification strategy 1 I choose to
keep the response of Real rates as negative on impact from the positive TFP
shock. Results from Smets and Wouters (2007) demonstrate that both nominal
interest rates and real rates fall on impact from a TFP shock, but by not enough
to avoid a fall in prices.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to FTS shock The impact from
FTS shock is considered as orthogonal to the TFP shock and is included in
the VAR through a zero restriction of the TFP (first variable in VAR) to FTS
shock (second shock in VAR). If we cannot control for the state of business cycle
(TFP shocks), then there could be confusion whether the increase in price of
the safe asset is due to FTS or from a TFP linked economic downturn. The
news shocks literature [Barsky and E. R. Sims (2009) and (2011), Beaudry and
Portier (2005) and (2006)] also chooses some form of zero restriction on TFP from
news/sentiment shocks.
6The forward looking 3-equation NK model (see Gali 2008, Section 4.3.1.2) is given by:
the IS relation: yt = Et[yt+1] −
1
θ
(
it − Et[πt+1] + u
IS
t
)
, θ > 0
the Philips curve: πt = βEt[πt+1] + κ (yt − y
n
t ) , 0 < β < 1
and the policy rule: it = r
n
t + φππt + φy ỹt , κ > 0
where uISt is an AR(1) shock process, y
n is the flexible price level output, rn is the natural rate
that prevails flexible prices, and ỹ = y − yn.
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Flight to Safety by definition is a phenomenon when capital moves away from
risky assets to safer assets. Therefore on impact from a positive FTS shock the
Price of risk (the second variable of the benchmark VAR), which is difference
between Bond price and Equity price, is restricted with a positive sign restriction.
Favourable (or positive) news shocks, in some TFP related news shock literature
(Gambetti and Musso, 2017) are also linked to a fall in nominal rates after the
1980s. If we assume that FTS episodes are linked with pessimistic news about
future TFP, then similar restrictions that are advocated on Real rates from a
negative TFP news shock can be placed for identifying FTS shocks. Real rates
responses are therefore restricted to be positive on impact from FTS shock. On
impact of a Flight to Safety shock agents look to save for precautionary reasons
and therefore their surplus consumption would reduce. This provides us with the
third restriction which is a negative response of surplus ratio (the fourth variable
in benchmark VAR) on impact of a positive FTS shock. This is also consistent
with the results from Smets and Wouters (2007). That model has shocks to risk
premium such that an increase in the premia leads to fall in variables of business
cycle activity, such as hours and output and leads to an increase in the real interest
rates. An increase in risk-premia does not translate one-to-one into preference
for safety that is a hallmark of FTS. However, a risk premium shock leads to
increase in expected rate of return from risky assets and a fall in their prices. As
long as the shift in risk premium after the shock, is not uniform across the whole
spectrum of investments (of range least to highest risk), it can be safely argued
that the price gap between most risky and least risky investment widens after the
risk premium shock and use of the results from Smets and Wouters (2007) could
be justified.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to Policy shock To distinguish
monetary policy (MP) shock from TFP shock, a zero restriction is placed on the
response of TFP series (first variable in VAR) to monetary policy shock (third
shock in VAR). This is a commonly used restriction in identifying structural
monetary shocks in TFP and news shock literature (Beaudry, Nam, and Wang,
2011). No restrictions from the policy shock are placed on the Price of risk (second
series in VAR). A positive monetary policy surprise will lead to an increase in
nominal rates and fall in inflation expectations, therefore the Real rate responses
(third variable in VAR) are sign restricted to be positive. In Smets and Wouters
(2007) monetary policy shock leads to increase in interest rate, real interest rate,
and decrease in inflation. Structural model based evidence, including Smets
and Wouters (2007) supports the view that positive monetary policy surprises
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negatively impact consumption and surplus consumption and other business cycle
variables including hours and output, and so the response of surplus ratio (fourth
series in VAR) to positive monetary policy shock is sign restricted to be negative.
The shock to fourth variable (surplus ratio) which is a Demand shock is not
strictly identified in either of the identification strategies 1, 2, and 3. Therefore
no restrictions are imposed on the response of any variables in the VAR from
demand shocks that impact the Surplus ratio. There may be a case to include an
additional restriction that positive demand shocks lead to increase in Surplus ratio.
However I resist from doing so, for the main reason that the impact of demand
shocks on Surplus ratio in not straightforward as any changes in demand need to
be further decomposed into durables, non-durables or services to get their impact
on the Surplus ratio. Besides keeping the number of identifying restrictions small
has some philosophical backing based on the principle of Occam’s razor. It’s the
notion of ‘nominalism or reductionism’ (attributed to William of Occam) that
in explaining something no more than necessary assumptions should be made.
The identification strategy remains agnostic to the response of the 5th variable in
VAR or the variable of interest. No restrictions are imposed on this variable from
shocks to the remaining 4 variables in the VAR. In the benchmark model the 5th
variable, or the variable of interest, is Investments. The response of the variable of
interest stays agnostic in terms of Uhlig (2005) representation. Table 2 describes
the identification restrictions for various variables in benchmark 5 variable VAR.
4.2.2 Identification strategy 2
The Identification strategy 2 differs from Identification strategy 1 in the following
manner. The negative sign restrictions on the surplus ratio (the fourth variable
in the VAR) on impact of FTS and Policy shock are removed. They are replaced
by zero restrictions for both FTS shock and Monetary policy shock. So the
Surplus ratio which is a ratio of the difference between total consumption and
non-durable and services consumption (habits) to total consumption, does not
react contemporaneously to Flight to Safety shock and Monetary policy shocks.
This is done to acknowledge an alternative empirical literature which argues for a
lack of contemporaneous effect of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic
variables such as investment, output and consumption, as their data is only
available with a lag. On including sign restrictions given in Identification strategy
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2 (see Table 2 on page 37) the B(0) and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =











+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ 0 0 . .
. . . . .











and B(1) =











+ . . . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ . . . .
. . . . .











(20)
4.2.3 Identification strategy 3
Identification strategy 3 has one less restriction from the previous two Identifica-
tion strategies 1 & 2. In this strategy the positive impact restriction of Flight to
Safety shocks on Real rates, the third variable of the VAR, is removed. So Real
rates is only positively restricted to Monetary policy shocks and is left unrestricted
for FTS shocks. In both Identification strategies 1 & 2, the response of Real rates
had same restriction (to be positive on impact) to both FTS and Monetary policy
shocks. That assumption was open to the possibility that some latent shock, which
could meet the imposed restrictions of both FTS and Monetary policy shock to
real rates, could be responsible for the results of the model. Identification strategy
3, breaks that link by restricting the impulse responses to Real rates from Policy
and FTS shocks differently and therefore avoids the possibility of responses being
driven form any common external shock. By analysing the differences between
the impulse response from two different Identification strategies (1 and 3, or 2
and 3), we can get further convincing evidence of whether the shocks that this
empirical exercise identifies are in fact FTS shocks.
On including sign restrictions given in Identification strategy 3 (see Table 2
on page 37) the B(0) and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =











+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− . + . .
+ 0 0 . .
. . . . .











and B(1) =











+ . . . .
. + . . .
− . + . .
+ . . . .
. . . . .











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A reason for choosing different identification strategies 1, 2 and 3 in this study,
is the inherent assumptions in those strategies about the key drivers and prop-
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agation channel behind the model. By assuming a direct and contemporaneous
link between the shock variable and macroeconomic variables, we are assuming
that forward looking rational households can anticipate the shocks and respond
immediately, on the other hand by excluding such contemporaneous relationship
we are testing if the shock variable is a primary driver of any change in the
macroeconomic series.
Recall that the sign restrictions in 5 variable VAR are implemented for a
maximum horizon of one period after the shock, i.e. the restrictions are valid for
the shock period and one period after. Whereas, zero restrictions are imposed
only on the impact period. The maximum lag length considered on the basis
of information criteria is 4 quarters. The results of all models are tested for
robustness have been tested over various horizons and other lags.
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5 Structural VAR Results
This section describes the benchmark structural VAR results to show that Flight
to Safety shocks inflict a long and lasting impact on the business cycle variables.
The results from some investment-related variables compare well with the observed
lack of investment growth in periods following the global financial crisis when
economic pessimism or Flight to Safety was at higher levels. The section also
shows how effective are various identification strategies in picking up innovations
in Flight to Safety. It discusses the impact this identification has on beliefs about
economic channels that guide investor behaviour during business cycles.
Let us first look at the identified structural shocks from benchmark VAR,
which are plotted in Figure 8 on page 47, where the shaded areas represent the
peak to trough dates of NBER recessions. The identified shocks correspond well
with recessionary periods. The scale and size of shocks in the 1990-91 recession
is smaller than in the other two recessions of 2000-01 and 2007-09. Most inter-
estingly, only the Flight to Safety shock displays the most significant jump of its
entire history during the 2007-09 recession. This brings us back to the original
purpose of identifying data series and events related to the unprecedented global
financial crisis more than they do so with any other post-war recession. The
initial assessment portrays FTS shock as a likely candidate.
We can further assess the usefulness of the vector autoregressions in the
benchmark configuration of the model by looking at identified structural shocks
that are quite orthogonal (see Figure 9 on page 48) and uncorrelated. Figure 9
shows the probability distribution of these shocks, the regression line of one shock
on another, and the correlation coefficients between the identified shocks. The
regression line and scatter plots display a lack of meaningful relationships between
the shocks. Correlation coefficients for most of them are not significant. There
is some linkage in identified TFP and FTS shocks as their correlation coefficient
has a small negative slope, which shows that positive FTS shocks appear to be
leading to adverse TFP shocks. We further explore this feature in the following
section through the results of impulse responses to FTS shocks.
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Figure 8: Identified structural shocks
Notes: Median structural shocks from 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 and their 68% confidence
bands. Shocks are identified through the benchmark 5-variable VAR, using Sign and
Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. The 5 variables in that model are: TFP,
Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments.
The shaded areas represent peak to trough period of NBER recessions. Respective
shocks are: TFP, FTS, Monetary Policy, Demand and Residual.
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Figure 9: Orthogonality of structural shocks
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Notes: Regression (line) of one structural shock on another, and Probability distribution
of structural shocks identified in benchmark 5 variable VAR using Identification strategy
1. r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient. p is Two-tailed p-value of the correlation
coefficient. The 5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP, Price of risk (Bond
minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments. Respective shocks are:
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5.1 Economic contractions from Flight to Safety
In this section, the results from identification strategy 1 (as discussed in Table 2
on page 37) for the 5 variable VAR with variables: Total factor productivity, Price
of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio, and Investments are discussed. Investments are
a key variable of interest, and in later studies, it is replaced with other variables
such as Output, Consumption, Hours, and CPI.
Figure 10 on page 50 plots the impulse responses from identified Flight to
Safety shocks on all variables of the benchmark 5-variable VAR with Investments
as the key variable that is unrestricted and considered agnostic in the identification
strategy. Additionally, the figure also reports ‘Hours’ when replacing the variable
‘Investment’ in the benchmark model. Similarly, in Figure 11 on page 52 results
of other variables of interests as they replace the fifth variable of the benchmark
VAR are reported. The impulse response results for the first 4 variables in these
alternate models are similar to those of the benchmark model where ‘Investment’
is the variable of interest. So, preserving space and time, they are only reported
once, i.e., for the benchmark model.
The results (in Figure 10) show that the pessimism and risk aversion resulting
from Flight to Safety shocks has a long term impact on the business cycle. The
Bond minus Equity price (Price of risk) series jumps upon impact from FTS
shocks. As described earlier, an unexpected increase in the price of a safe asset
(10-year T-bond) vis-á-vis the price of a risky asset (S&P 500) symbolizes an
increase in investors’ preference for safety over risky investments, or Flight to
Safety. So as expected from sign and zero restrictions set out in Identification
strategy 1, we witness an immediate jump in this series of 4-5%. An impact of
this size cannot be fully generated from an increase in the safe asset price alone.
The yields on safe asset (bonds) are meager, and a 4-5% increase in prices (or a
drop in yields of this magnitude) cannot be obtained without violating the Zero
lower bound on bond yields. Therefore a steeper fall in S&P 500 index on impact
from FTS shock is the primary driver of this sudden jump in the Price of risk
series. Once the FTS shock has hit, it takes near 28 quarters for the series to
return to its pre-shock levels. The identified FTS shock thus demonstrates a long
term impact on the investors’ preference for safer assets.
Identification strategy 1 (discussed in table Table 2 on page 37) restricts the
response of Real rate to FTS shocks to be positive and Surplus ratio to be negative
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Figure 10: Impulse responses of Benchmark VAR to FTS shocks
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Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of variables in
benchmark VAR model to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. which are identified
with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3. In all charts,
Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after
the shock. Benchmark VAR has five variables: Total factor productivity, Price of
risk (which generates the FTS shocks), Real rate, Surplus ratio is one minus ratio of
consumption (non-durable goods and services) to total consumption and ‘Investment’.
In another iteration of the 5 variable VAR model ‘Investment’ is replaced with ‘Hours’.
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for the shock period and one period following the shock. Both these variables
behave as expected. The Real rate rises, and the Surplus ratio falls on impact.
The median impulse response of Real rates increases by 0.3 percent, whereas the
fall in the median Surplus ratio response is about -0.1 percent. The latter is a
significant fall for two reasons, the first of which is that there is not much scope
for the Surplus ratio to fall. This ratio in Data in the long run averages around
12 percent, as habits (i.e., consumption of services and non-durable goods) form a
significant (∼90%) portion of total consumption. Furthermore, the second reason
is that the consumption-based models [Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Cochrane
(2017), De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)] which consider surplus ratio in the utility
function, demonstrate that even for a small decline in this ratio there is relatively
big spike in consumers’ marginal utility.
The identification strategy 1 also puts a zero restriction on the response of
total factor productivity so that the identified Flight to Safety shock is orthogonal
to TFP. As a result, we see that the impulse response of TFP is muted on the
impact of the FTS shock. However, it begins to turn negative around 8-10 periods
after the shock and slides after that for another 12 quarters. For the length of
business cycle frequency (8-32 quarters) after the FTS shock, there is a persistent
decline in TFP.
Investment, which is the variable of interest in the benchmark 5-variable VAR,
is kept unrestricted as no sign or zero restrictions are imposed on it from any
shocks in the model. The impulse response in Investment is negative on the
initial impact of FTS shock. Investment decisions are made many periods in
advance, explaining the smaller immediate drop in Investments on the impact of
the Flight to Safety shocks. However, the response reaches a median quarterly
fall of around -3% in a short span of 2-3 periods after the shock. It sustains this
L-shaped response and stays below -2% for about 10-12 quarters. The impulse
responses also show that Investments are very slow to recover to their pre-shock
levels. What is probably more significant is that after the impulse response in
Investment reaches its lowest, i.e., 3-4 quarter after the impact of FTS shock, only
then the Total factor productivity (TFP) begins to decline.
To better understand the mechanism through which FTS impacts the business
cycle, ‘Investment’ in the benchmark configuration is replaced with other macroe-
conomic variables. They are ‘Hours’ whose impulse responses to FTS shocks are
presented in Figure 10 on page 50 itself and six other variables. Impulse responses
to FTS shock for these six variables are presented in Figure 11 on page 52. These
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Figure 11: Impulse responses of Macro variables to FTS shocks
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Notes: Median impulse response (in %) and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Macro
variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark VAR
model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters)
horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in the VAR model
are reported. ‘Disp Income’ stands for Disposable Income. ‘1y-10y spread’ is the
difference between yields of 1 year and 10 year US Treasury bonds. ‘Cons (NDur +
Svc)’ is Consumption of Non-durable goods and Services.
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additional variables include four business cycle variables: ‘Output’, ‘Disposable
income’, ‘Consumption (Non-Durables and Services)’ and total ‘Consumption’,
a pricing variable ‘CPI’ and a liquidity variable ‘1y-10y spread’ which is the
difference in the yields of 1-year and 10-year US treasury bonds.
The impulse responses to these variables represent a negative hump-shaped
response. ‘Hours’ exhibits a negative response that is slow to begin and decreases
gradually, which resembles a reverse hump shape. However, except for hours
neither of the other business cycle variables fully recover to their pre-shock levels.
The median response in hours is small and reaches a minimum of approximately
-0.9% around 10 periods after the shock. In contrast, the TFP for the first
8-10 quarters has been non-negative, which means the decline in hours is not
driven by technical regress. Similarly, the responses in other variables of interest
- Output, Disposable Income, Consumption (Non-Durables and Services), and
Consumption - cannot be linked to a fall in TFP. It can be argued that their fall
is more synchronous with Flight to Safety. Since after the Flight to Safety (FTS)
shock has hit, the impulse response in these variables keeps on reducing for 10
periods, whereas for the same period after the shock, the TFP is non-negative.
It also seems that the impact of Flight to Safety shocks on macro variables
must be playing out through a long-term decline in Investments. The impulse
response in Investments has a faster and a more significant decline, almost 3-4
times of the decline witnessed in Hours, Consumption, Output, Consumption
(of Non-durables and Services) and Disposable income. The negative impact on
these macro variables of interest continues for 8-10 quarters before reaching its
nadir and recovering after that. 8-10 quarters is also the time around when the
steep fall in Investments begins to ameliorate. Therefore we can safely say that
TFP shocks do not bring the economic gloom that is shown in ‘Investments’ and
other variables of interest. Instead, it is driven by the pessimism in the economy
brought out from a structural FTS shock.
This highlights the investment-oriented effects of FTS shocks, and provides
evidence to one of the hypotheses set out at the inception of this study. Flight to
Safety, which is a sudden change in preference for safer investments by investors
through resource re-allocation, leads to an eventual decline in overall TFP. As
when only safer (or less productive) economic investments are undertaken, the
entire economy’s production and productivity suffers.
One could also argue that the economic contraction is unrelated to TFP
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declines and is caused by the FTS shock. This contradicts other studies in the
literature that follow the (Barro and King, 1984) conjecture, which has argued that
investment re-allocation is not a major driving force of the business cycles. Several
empirical studies on the news [Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) Nam and Wang
(2019)] and expectations shocks identify that those shocks only lead a TFP shock
by 1-2 quarters. Therefore, the TFP shock appears to cause changes to macro
variables and business cycles in those studies. The long lead time between FTS
shock and TFP shock that we get in impulse responses of Identification strategy
1 breaks that link and leads us in seeking an alternate driving mechanism.
Habits or Consumption (Non-durables and Services) are also slow to react
initially upon the impact of the FTS shock, but they end up mimicking the
decline in Consumption and after 30 periods end up about -0.5% lower that their
pre-shock levels. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that the
precautionary motives exhibited during FTS generate a correction in even the
most hard-wired of consumption behaviour (habits). Secondly, for a consumer
looking for her utility maximization, a stabilization of the surplus ratio (i.e., one
minus the ratio of habits to total consumption) matters more than stabilization
of total Consumption or Habits.
The median response of term spread, in Figure 11, which is measured as the
difference in yield between the short-dated 1-year US Treasury bond and the
long-dated 10-year US Treasury Bond, picks up slightly on the impact of the FTS
shock. However, the move is not significant, especially when compared to the
rise in the Price of risk. It demonstrates that the preference for safety that is a
hallmark of an FTS shock does not significantly translate into a preference for
liquidity, i.e. preference for the short term over long term safe bonds. This is
not surprising since most long-term investors such as pension funds would match
the duration of the risky assets that they are shedding from their portfolio with
the duration of the safe investments they are undertaking in response to the FTS
shock.
The impact of FTS shock on consumer prices (CPI) supports our conviction
of imposing a positive restriction (in Strategy 1) on Real rates from the impact of
FTS shock. The rationale for such restriction was that a Flight to Safety shock
is dis-inflationary, and the evidence in the impulse response of CPI confirms it.
The median CPI falls around 0.2% per quarter, or we can say there is a deflation
of 0.2% quarterly deflation on the impact of FTS shock. The median CPI does
not recover for the tested horizon of 30 periods, which for the quarterly inflation
5.1 Economic contractions from Flight to Safety 55
rate means that a few quarters after the Flight to Safety shock, the inflation
rate consolidates around zero percent. This shows that FTS shock is deflationary
on impact and non-inflationary in the long run, a sign of economic pessimism.
Thus looking at the impulse responses of various macro variables, we can make
an assessment that a Flight to Safety shock leads to an overall economic gloom
in the economy.
The results highlight the fact that either one of the two possible channels
of speculation or expectations through which FTS can impact the economy is
at play. The speculation channel relies on FTS resulting from over-correction
by speculators from a realization of negative news or information shock about
the economy. If that were true, then the economic adjustment to FTS would
have been swift. Nevertheless, given the slow but significant response of key
Investment and activity-related variables to FTS shock and the long lead time
of 8-10 quarters in the decline of total factor productivity after the FTS shock
indicate that speculation may not be the primary mechanism driving this effect.
The expectations channel relies on the notion that Flight to Safety emerges from
expectations being formed about the deteriorating future state of the economy. It
posits that FTS shocks are based on rational expectations and present a warning
signal of an eventual decline in economic activity. If this were true, then FTS
is an even earlier warning signal than news and sentiment shocks, where the
lead time is usually 3-4 quarters. This seems plausible, as FTS represents an
increase in risk-aversion, so providing a warning of impending deterioration in
the economy motivates risk-averse rational agents to reallocate investment capital
from risky to less risky (and also less productive) sectors. This re-allocation of
risk over time feeds into a decline in economic activity and a decline in total fac-
tor productivity. This paper’s empirical approach is not sufficient to distinguish
between the two, but some clarity can emerge from looking at various impulse re-
sponses from different identification schemes. Through evidence posted by various
macroeconomic variables, there is some inclination towards favouring the latter
expectations driven explanation that FTS shock predates an economic downturn.
We can further strengthen this conviction from the results of Investment and
Labour related business cycle variables.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses of Labour variables to FTS shocks
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.2
0.0
Hrs per emp
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.5
0.0
0.5
Wages
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.00
0.25
Unemployment Rate
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.1
0.0
Vacancy Rate
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.1
0.0
0.1
Participation rate
0 10 20 30
Horizon
5
0
Vac Unemp Ratio
0 10 20 30
Horizon
1
0
Capacity Util
0 10 20 30
Horizon
0.5
0.0
0.5
Outp per Emp
0 10 20 30
Horizon
1
0
Hours
Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Labour related
variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark VAR
model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters)
horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in the VAR model
are reported. ‘Hrs per Emp’ is Hours worked per employee. ‘Vac Unemp’ is ratio of
Vacancy rate to Unemployment rate.
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5.2 Cyclicality of Labour and Investment sector
To provide further evidence that identified FTS shocks consistently explain the
properties of US business cycles, this section compares the impulses responses in
Identification strategy 1 (see Table 2), of a 5-variable VAR model where either a
labour market variable (Figure 12) or an investment sector variable (Figure 13)
is the variable of interest. Recall that in this identification the impact of TFP
shock is restricted to be positive on the utility-adjusted TFP and Surplus ratio,
and is restricted to negative on Real rates. The impact response of FTS shock
is positive on the Price of risk (Bond-Equity price), positive on Real rates, and
negative on Surplus ratio. The Monetary policy shock impact is restricted to
positive on Real rate and negative on the Surplus ratio. Both FTS and Monetary
policy shock are orthogonal to TFP shock.
The identified FTS shocks substantially impact unemployment rate and labour
force participation rate (Figure 12 on page 56). Hours per worker decline slightly
on the FTS shock impact and recover fast; also, they are not the major driver
of total hours. These responses agree with Shimer (2005) empirical result that
the major driver of the decline in total hours is not hours per worker but the
unemployment rate. The intensive margin, given by hours per worker, is only
partially responsible for fluctuations in aggregate hours and other labor market
constituents.
The impulse responses to the Vacancy rate and the Unemployment rate are
opposite to each other, signifying the negative correlation between the two at
business cycle frequencies. Search based models of unemployment and business
cycles (of which Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is a key example) cannot generate
the high negative correlation between the unemployment and vacancy rate. Due
to the Nash bargaining mechanisms, the real wage determined in these models is
too flexible (Shimer, 2005).
The results from Flight to Safety shocks generate a vacancy to unemployment
ratio that is procyclical and a real wage rate that is highly sticky and in line
with the Beveridge curve that portrays a downward sloping relation between the
Vacancy rate and the Unemployment rate in the US data. The Labour force
participation rate in our results is also procyclical. The impulse responses (in
Figure 12) for labour productivity, which is the ratio of output to hours, exhibits
an increase on the impact of FTS shocks. Whereas Hours, Output, Consumption
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Figure 13: Impulse responses of Investment variables to FTS shocks
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Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Investment
related variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark
VAR model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to
2019:Q3. In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time
(in quarters) horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in
the VAR model are reported. ‘Res’ is Residential, ‘Non-Res’ is Non-Residential,
‘Inv + Durables Cons’ is sum of Investments and Durables Consumption, ‘Rel.Px of
Inv’ is the Relative price of Investment in terms of Consumption, ‘Gov.’ stands for
Government.
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reduce during the first 10 periods after the shock. This incongruity of response
of labour-related business cycle variables with the response of TFP and labour
productivity shows that the key driver behind this economic gloom is not the
decline in TFP but rather an increase in economic pessimism breeding the Flight
to Safety. This finding contradicts the economic models that ignore the role of
expectations and cyclical risk-aversion in business cycles.
Further investigation into the constituent variables of investments, i.e., resi-
dential and non-residential investment (See Figure 13) shows that the residential
investments react slowly to the FTS shock. However, after around 10 periods, it
reaches a median reduction of -4% per quarter. Most housing-related investments
are planned for many periods in advance. Once the residential investment projects
are approved, they are slow to roll back, and once these plans are stalled or aban-
doned, they are even more challenging to get re-approved. On the other hand,
non-residential investments that are more agile in comparison react early on the
shock’s impact. They consolidate after about 5 quarters at a median response of
-2% per quarter and recover faster than residential investments. Capital expendi-
ture is held back by -2% and is faster to react than residential and non-residential
investments. The FTS shocks have a lesser impact on R&D expense which is a
more stable form of investments. Similarly the consumption of the Durable goods
of households, a part of Investment plus Durable series, is steadier than total
investments. It declines by a little over -2% upon the impact of an FTS shock.
The impact of FT S shocks on both Government expenditure, and Foreign flows
are felt only in the long run. More importantly, FTS shock on impact lowers the
relative price of investment good (in terms of consumption).
The variable ‘Relative price of investment’ in business cycle literature has
been used as a series to develop investment-specific technology shocks and the
marginal efficiency of investment shocks. The Flight to Safety shocks identified
in this study do not run against the investment shocks literature-based evidence.
A positive shock to investments lowers the relative price of investment in terms
of the consumption good in models of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti
(2010) and (2011), and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) among others.
The procyclical relative price of investments, which is a hallmark of investment-
specific technology shocks-based explanations of business cycles, is also visible
in this chapter’s impulse responses. The ratio of investment price to price of
consumer good falls on impact of the FTS shock, i.e. consumption becomes
relatively expensive.
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An immediate application of the findings is to get decomposition of forecast
error-variance (See Table 5 to 9 in appendix pages 111 - 115) and to determine
what proportion (Figure 14 on page 61) of the k-step ahead forecast variation, esp.
at business cycle frequency (8-32 quarters) is explained by identified innovations
to FTS.
The FTS shock explain a major share of Forecast error variance at business
cycle frequency for each of the key business cycle variables: Output (58%), Con-
sumption (50%), Investment (60%), Residential Investment (40%), Income (55%),
Hours (55%), TFP (20%), Surplus ratio (30%), Real rate (35%). The FEV
contribution for FTS shocks to key macro variable peaks before an increase in
contribution from TFP shocks. Suggesting that FTS shocks rather than TFP
shocks drive the highlighted business cycle features.
Table 3: Identification strategy for Flight to Risk shocks
variables TFP Value of Risk Real rate Surplus ratio Variable of interest
shocks
FTR Strategy 1
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to Risk 0 + − + .
Monetary policy 0 . + − .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Notes: The SVAR for identifying Flight to Risk shocks has 5 variables: TFP, Value of risk
(which is Equity price minus Bond price), Real rate, Surplus ratio (which is One minus the
ratio of Consumption of services and Non-durable to Total consumption), and a business cycle
variable of interest for e.g. Investments , Output, Consumption, Hours, CPI etc. On impact
of the respective shock, + means the variable is restricted to be positive and − means that
the variable is restricted to be negative for the impact horizon. The impact horizon is shock
period plus one more period. Symbol 0 signifies a zero restriction when the response variable is
restricted to not respond to the shock contemporaneously, and Dots . signify that the impact
response of that variable is left unrestricted.
5.3 Asymmetry in FTS and FTR
One of the peculiar and significant features of Flight to Safety (FTS) or a sudden
increase in preference for safer investments is that the market volatility and uncer-
tainty experienced in such episodes are not reciprocated during its complementary
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Figure 14: FEVD explained by TFP, FTS and MP shocks
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Notes: The k-step ahead Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD %) explained
by FTS (Solid), TFP (Dots) and Monetary Policy (Dash) shocks, in the 5-variable
VAR, which is identified using Sign and Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. The
5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP, Price of risk (Bond minus Equity
price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investment. In other iterations of the model,
‘Investment’ is replaced with other variables of interest. The result of benchmark VAR
and other variables of interest are reported.
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market phenomenon of Flight to Risk (FTR). FTR is when investors prefer risky
investments to safer bets. Such differential behaviour is based on the human
psyche and behavioural biases that are out of this study’s scope. However, for the
purpose of our analysis, it is interesting to consider whether the impact of FTS
is reversed for shocks of opposite magnitude. An FTR shock series is developed
by choosing a complementary identification to the one imposed in the benchmark
study. Impulse response results from this series help uncover FTR shocks’ impact
and keep the analysis relevant and comparable to the benchmark FTS model
results.
The FTR shocks are identified by changing the sign of the Price of risk series,
i.e. by calculating it as the difference between the Price of S&P 500 and the
10-year Treasury bond. This could be called a Value of Risk series or negative
Price of risk series. Therefore an increase in the Value of Risk or Equity minus
Bond price series occurs when Equities get more expensive compared to bonds,
and a positive shock to this series is studied as Flight to Risk. The identification
strategy imposed in identifying FTR shocks is also adjusted to account for the
complementary changes to benchmark strategy 1. A positive shock in the Value
of Risk series for the impact horizon is restricted to a fall in Real rates and an
increase in the Surplus ratio. Both these sign restrictions are opposite in signs to
the sign restrictions imposed on these variables in the benchmark strategy 1 for
identifying FTS shocks. Similar to FTS shocks the FTR shocks are also restricted
to be orthogonal to TFP and monetary policy shocks. Table 3 on page 60 presents
the identification restrictions imposed in identifying FTR shocks.
The impulse responses to FTR shocks, as shown in Figure 15 on page 64,
highlight the asymmetry in the response of Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk
shocks. These impulse responses to FTR shocks are smaller in magnitude and
short-lived compared to the impulse responses to FTS shocks. The increase in
Equity minus Bond price (or a decrease in Bond minus Equity price) from an FTR
shock leads to very slow adjustments in investments, hours, output, non-residential
investments, inflation, and TFP and real rates when compared with their response
to FTS shocks. The lack of negative response in Real rates is because monetary
policy response is exogenous to the model. An increase in inflation after Flight to
Risk does not warrant policy cuts from the inflation-targeting central bank. Real
rates become negative when inflation stabilizes. The residential investment shows
a lack of response, which is not that puzzling when considering that residential
purchases are long-term decisions. These can be put away easily when faced with
a Flight to Safety phenomenon, but they are not immediately put on board after
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a Flight to Risk. Housing is a long-term investment, and in the case of Flight
to Risk shocks, the immediate response should be felt in more volatile (risky)
but liquid options. The residential investment increases after 5 years of risk-
taking. There is also a counter-intuitive fall in surplus ratio after an FTR shock.
However, it can be explained by the slow response of output and consumption
in comparison to the more significant increase in consumption (of Non-Durables
and Services) habits. The increase in habits is also responsible for the relative
price of investment goods in terms of consumption good getting into the negative
territory. The surplus ratio slowly returns to its pre-shock levels. There is also
feedback from FTR shocks to TFP, which reacts positively 5-8 quarters after the
shock. Interestingly the response is delayed as it was in response to FTS shocks,
highlighting the expectations channel through which the capital flight can impact
productivity in an economy.
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Figure 15: Asymmetry between Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk
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Notes: The figure shows impulse responses to Flight to Safety (solid) and Flight to
Risk (diamonds) shocks. FTS shocks are identified with restriction strategy 1 in
the benchmark VAR model. The FTR shocks are identified by imposing restriction
strategy discussed in the Results section Table 3. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
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6 Sensitivity and Robustness analysis
The benchmark results are identified with Strategy 1 and using 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3
period US data. This section analyses the sensitivity of those results to alternative
identification strategies viz. Strategy 2 and Strategy 3 (given in Table 2). And
to alternative data periods viz. pre-Great Moderation data (1954:Q3 to 1978:Q4)
and pre-financial crisis or Great Moderation period of 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q2. This
section also compares FTS results with estimation output from DSGE models
and explores the relationship of FTS shocks with other News and Uncertainty
shocks.
6.1 Alternative identification strategies
In Identification strategy 2 (refer Table 2 on page 37), the negative restriction on
the impact of FTS shock to surplus ratio, which was included in Identification
strategy 1, is removed. In place of that, a zero restriction is imposed on the
Surplus ratio on impact from the FTS shock. The impact of FTS shock on Real
rates is still kept, as it was in Identification strategy 1, at positive for the impact
horizon, i.e., the shock period and the next period. In addition, the response of
the Surplus ratio in the identification strategy 2 has a Zero restriction on impact
from Monetary policy shock as well.
Changes in identification strategy 2 can be summarised in the following way.
An increase in FTS is restricted to a positive impact on Price of risk and Real
rates, Monetary policy shock is restricted to have a positive impact on Real
rates, and both FTS and Monetary shock are orthogonal to the Surplus ratio.
Whereas, in this strategy, the impact restrictions for TFP shocks are unchanged
from Identification strategy 1 and are orthogonal to both FTS and Monetary
policy shock. The responses of the variable of interest, which is Investment or
any other macro variable, are kept agnostic.
The impulse responses to FTS shocks under Identification strategy 2, which are
plotted as dashes in Figure 16 on page 66, are not significantly different from the
responses to Identification strategy 1, which are represented by a solid line with
its 68% confidence band is shaded in the same fig. 16. The decline in Investments
is severe and keeps around -2% for around 10 quarters. The impulse responses in
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Figure 16: Sensitivity of impulse responses to identification strategies
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key business cycle variables of interest such as hours, output, and consumption
are immediate (See Figure 16) and are shaped in an inverse hump. The reduction
in Consumption (non-durables and services) and the Surplus ratio is delayed by 2
periods, and the response is now less severe than it was in identification strategy
1. The response of the Surplus ratio stabilizes to pre-shock level as Habits fall
in line with Consumption. The median response reaches a minimum of only
-0.04%, which is due to the differences in identifying restrictions between Strategy
1 and Strategy 2. More importantly, the response of TFP is muted for around 10
periods and is nearly as severe as it was during the identification Strategy 1. This
exercise in identification strategy 2 shows that the Surplus ratio restriction was
not driving the future decay in TFP. Instead, it further supports the argument
that the FTS shocks predate, by a significant period, an imminent fall in TFP.
Identification strategy 3 is different from identification strategy 2 and strategy 1
concerning restrictions based on FTS shocks. The restriction imposed (in strategy
1 and 2) on the real rate response to be less than zero on the FTS shock impact
is removed, and this variable is made unrestricted to the FTS shock. But the
zero restrictions to TFP and Surplus ratio variables are kept, as they were in
Identification strategy 2. Therefore Price of risk (Bond minus Equity prices) is the
only variable that is restricted to increase on the impact of a positive FTS shock.
The impact restrictions for TFP shocks are unchanged and are kept the same as
they were in identification strategy 1 and identification strategy 2. The monetary
shock has restrictions for only the Real rate to be positive for the impact period
(shock period and the next period) horizon and has zero restrictions on the impact
of the TFP series and the Surplus ratio. The impact response from the variable
of interest is unrestricted and kept agnostic.
Thus Identification strategy 3 is a way to distinguish between the responses
of FTS and Monetary Shocks. By removing the restriction on Real rate upon
the impact of FTS shocks, we would like to ascertain if the shocks that we have
identified are FTS shocks and are not driven by some exogenous shocks that
impact both FTS and Monetary policy shocks similarly.
The results from identification strategy 3 are represented by triangles in Fig-
ure 16 on page 66. They differ from our findings from the results of the first 2
identification strategies. Once we take out the impact restriction on Real rate to
be positive for an FTS shock, the real rates’ median response is only slightly pos-
itive +0.1% on impact, whereas the fall in CPI upon impact from the FTS shock
is -0.2%. This result should not be puzzling as it shows that the jump in Real
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rates from FTS shock is cut short by a simultaneous response of the Monetary
policy, or a cut in nominal rates. It signifies that FTS shocks are co-incidental
with cuts in policy rates, which further strengthens our initial hypothesis of the
FTS shock being a pre-cursor of worsening economic climate.
By removing the restriction on response of Real rates in Identification Strategy
3, we can also remove the constraints on contemporaneous changes in monetary
policy in response to FTS shocks. This leaves the interest rate policy some scope
to be pre-emptive. Therefore the cuts in real rates in this strategy occur earlier
compared to rate cuts in strategy 1 and 2. Through this, we witness that the
delay in the response of TFP to FTS shocks is also shortened. Evidently, the
TFP begins to decline after 5 periods, whereas it declines 8-10 periods after FTS
shocks in identification strategy 1. Hours, output, consumption, and investment
all exhibit a faster decline (or a shorter slump) and reach the minimum around
the same time, i.e., 5 periods after the shock, when total factor productivity
growth becomes less than zero. The main result from different identification
strategies reinforces the conviction of results of identification strategy 1, which
is that the innovations in Price of Risk (Bond minus Equity prices) predate a
general economic slump, which in around 8-10 quarters also leads to an eventual
decline in TFP.
Next, we look to address the possible criticism that the chosen data period in
our benchmark configuration period of 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 is heavily influenced
by the increase in the supply of safe assets around the world since the global
financial crisis and by the impact of the crisis itself. This criticism is addressed by
curtailing the analysis to the pre-crisis period of 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q2, which is also
the Great Moderation period. We also consider the sensitivity of the results to
the pre-Great Moderation period of 1954:Q3 to 1978:Q4, intending to understand
the influence of great moderation on the strength of Flight to Safety shocks.
6.2 Impact of Great moderation period
From the mid-80s to global financial crises, the Great moderation period represents
a period in the macroeconomic history of developed economies when the incidence
and volatility of business cycle fluctuations were significantly reduced from the
decades that preceded it, 1954 to 1978. Structural developments in public policy
and the Federal reserve’s policy commitment and communication strategy were
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influential in bringing out this change in business cycle incidence and volatility
during the Great Moderation period. It is argued that economic agents were
better able to form expectations about future economic and policy uncertainty
during great moderation than in the decades that preceded it.
The results of this empirical study show us that FTS shocks breed in pes-
simism about the general economic climate that predates an eventual decline in
future TFP. One of the reasons this is possible is if FTS shocks signal households
to expect future TFP and economic growth to be weaker. If these expectations
are well-formed, then in line with the Great moderation literature, they must
be significantly well-formed in the Great moderation era 1983-2007 than in the
volatile era 1954-1978. Figure 17 on page 70 shows the median impulse responses
to FTS shocks for business cycles variables of macroeconomic variables of interest
for the pre-Great moderation period (1954-1978) in dashes, and the Great Mod-
eration period (1985-2007) in squared line. This figure also compares these two
periods with the benchmark period (1985-2019) median response given in a solid
line. The shaded area depicts 68% confidence bands for the benchmark period
responses.
It is clear from the results that the FTS shock has a limited impact during the
pre-Great moderation period (dashes in Figure 17). This suggests that FTS shocks
have been more critical in the Great moderation period. Due to the available
technology, structural policy changes and low inflation in this period, it was easier
to form expectations about the future TFP growth. Moreover, through improved
trading opportunities and increased participation from retail investors, there has
been an increase in availability and awareness about risky and safe assets in the
Great moderation period as compared to the earlier period. The impact of the
global financial crisis is also visible through the comparison of Great Moderation
(squares) and the benchmark period (solid) results in fig. 17. The inclusion of
post-Global financial crisis data accentuates the responses in unemployment and
residential investments. What stands out most from the result is that during
the Great Moderation, the response of investment, hours, real rates, utilization-
adjusted total factor productivity is similar in scale and scope as predicted by
the benchmark model. It reinstates our conviction in the results that FTS shocks
generate business cycle fluctuations.
Thus from the various identification strategies, periods, and business cycle
variables employed in this empirical study, we can confirm that the identified
FTS shocks of the Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price) series are linked to
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Figure 17: Sensitivity of impulse responses to different time periods
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an increase in investors’ risk aversion. They enforce a chilling effect on economic
activity and predate a decline in total factor productivity. The results reinforce
our initial contention for undertaking this empirical study, which was that FTS
shocks have an immediate and long-term negative impact on economic activity esp.
Investments. The delayed response of TFP to FTS shocks brings to light the two
channels through which FTS impacts the business cycles. Either FTS shock is an
over-correction to a speculative bet gone wrong. Or FTS is grounded in rational
expectations and represents a risk-aversion shock that induces a re-allocation of
capital to safer assets, usually less productive. This increase in pessimism or fear
of risk in a sufficient number of agents leads to an imminent long-term decline in
economic activity. It is neither the objective nor the scope of this study to decide
which of the two expectations channel is more crucial. However, the large and
varied set of data included in this empirical exercise and the different assumptions
imposed through identification strategies incline us towards the latter.
6.3 News, Uncertainty and Risk premium shocks
In this section, we check for the robustness of the identification strategy. The
analysis starts by looking to answer the criticism that information present in
Flight to Safety shocks identified in this chapter is comparable to other News
and Uncertainty shocks. Therefore, pursuing the Flight to Safety line of inquiry
may not extend our understanding of the business cycle by much. Beaudry and
Portier (2006) and Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) uncover the effect of news
shocks on the business cycles by identifying news surprises as the shocks to an
equity index (S&P 500) series. One of the key results from that analysis is news
shocks predate fall in TFP by a couple of quarters. Following their classification
of choosing equity index to identify news shocks, we make a comparative analysis
in this chapter. The second variable in the benchmark model is replaced from
the ‘Price of risk’ series to S&P 500, and sign and zero restrictions set out in
Identification strategy 1 are used to identify ‘News’ shocks to the latter series.
Similarly, another comparison is made by replacing the ‘Price of risk’ series
in the benchmark model with Bloom (2009) Economic policy Uncertainty (EPU)
index, and sign and zero restrictions set out in Identification strategy 1 are used
to identify ‘Uncertainty’ shocks to the latter series.
The impulse response comparison of thus obtained news shocks and uncertainty
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Figure 18: News, Uncertainty and FTS shocks
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shocks with the Flight to Safety shocks is made in Figure 18 on page 72.
The careful reader may notice the slight difference in the impulse responses
for FTS in Figure 18 with respect to the ones presented in the Results section
earlier. This is because the impulse responses in Figure 18 are for the period
1985-2019, which is the entirety of the time period for which Bloom (2009) EPU
data is available.
Using only the information present in Equity prices (S&P500) for identifying
News shocks, we miss out on much information in the Price of risk series. An
impact of that loss of information is visible in impulse responses comparison of
News shocks with FTS shocks. The business cycle responses to News shocks
are less pronounced and short lived in comparison to the Flight to Safety and
Uncertainty shocks. One of the shortfalls of Uncertainty based explanations of
business cycle Bloom (2009) is that they have a short-lived impact. The response
of business cycle variables to Uncertainty shocks is similar in direction to their
response to FTS shocks, but it is significantly short lived and smaller in magnitude
for some of the key variables such as residential investments, hours, unemployment,
and surplus ratio. The explanatory power of news in Beaudry and Portier (2006)
and Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) comes from news disturbances in leading
the eventual change in TFP by 2-4 quarters. Through the lens of the identification
strategy assumed in this chapter, we see that news shocks have minimal impact on
the TFP. As discussed earlier, the FTS shocks lead to decline in the TPF growth
rate by 8-10 quarters. From the impulse responses of TFP to uncertainty shocks
(in fig. 18), we can say that the median response of TFP to uncertainty shocks is
also delayed by 8-10 quarters. This could signify that the uncertainty shocks are
an even earlier warning system for TFP decline than FTS shocks. Alternatively,
since the magnitude of response of TFP to uncertainty shocks is smaller than its
response to FTS shocks, one could counter-argue that it is the latter (FTS) shock
that is leading TFP decline through an increase in uncertainty.
Before attributing a lot of the explanatory power to uncertainty shocks, we
must also consider that the Economic policy uncertainty index (EPU), which
measures uncertainty shocks, is back-calculated by counting policy uncertainty
related words in news articles (Bloom, 2009). The EPU index already accounts
for most of the speculation and expectation feeding into the TFP decline and
Flight to Safety. There is a significant overlap between these, and the impulse
responses in Figure 18 may not be sufficient to resolve this confusion. So I use the
Granger-causality test [See Table 4 on page 74] for identifying the lead-lag relation
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between FTS and Uncertainty shocks. The exercise shows that the Price of risk
series, responsible for FTS shocks, Granger causes Uncertainty series at lags 2-3
while the Uncertainty series does not Granger cause the Price of risk at those
lags. It demonstrates a lagged relationship between the two where the long-run
impact of the Uncertainty shocks on TFP is a derivative of lagged FTS shocks.
Table 4: Granger Causality results for FTS shocks
A. Does lagged ‘Price of Risk’ series Granger cause any of these variables
lags EPU S&P 500 1y-10y Baa-Aaa TFP TFP(EqDur) Inv Share
1 0.658 0.709 0.134 0.09 0.017∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.865
2 0.016∗ 0.82 0.05∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.002 ∗∗ 0.96
3 0.048∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.101 0.002∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.94
4 0.091 0.0∗∗ 0.067 0.003∗∗ 0.056 0.009∗∗ 0.57
5 0.146 0.0∗∗ 0.063 0.007∗∗ 0.087 0.006 ∗∗ 0.657
6 0.063 0.0∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.154 0.011∗ 0.586
7 0.121 0.0∗∗ 0.126 0.004∗∗ 0.136 0.022∗ 0.69
8 0.121 0.0∗∗ 0.135 0.005∗∗ 0.121 0.031∗ 0.67
12 0.207 0.0 ∗∗ 0.18 0.009∗∗ 0.223 0.083 0.403
B. Does any of these lagged series Granger cause ‘Price of Risk’
lags EPU S&P 500 1y-10y Baa-Aaa TFP TFP(EqDur) Inv Share
1 0.334 0.713 0.28 0.236 0.579 0.478 0.695
2 0.081 0.432 0.159 0.323 0.277 0.131 0.718
3 0.062 0.494 0.281 0.263 0.063 0.007∗∗ 0.802
4 0.11 0.568 0.348 0.355 0.086 0.011∗ 0.831
5 0.202 0.571 0.034∗ 0.446 0.091 0.011∗ 0.864
6 0.166 0.631 0.07 0.546 0.014∗ 0.025∗ 0.605
7 0.151 0.795 0.046∗ 0.756 0.023∗ 0.033∗ 0.748
8 0.185 0.804 0.055 0.282 0.051 0.067 0.758
12 0.649 0.38 0.19 0.35 0.113 0.247 0.666
Notes: p-values are reported. ∗ signifies 95% confidence, ∗∗ signifies 99% confidence.
EPU: economic policy uncertainty index. 1y-10y: liquidity spread between 1 year and
10 year yields. Baa-Aaa: corporate bond spread. TFP(EqDur): TFP in Equipment
and Durables consumption. Inv Share: equipment and consumer durables share of total
output.
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Figure 19: Comparison with Smets & Wouters (2007)
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Notes: Comparison of median impulse responses to FTS shocks from Benchmark model
(Solid) with updated (to 2019:Q3) results from Smets and Wouters (2007) model. SW_TFP
is negative shock to TFP (Dash-dots), SW_RP is shock to Risk Premium, and SW_IST
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X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after the shock.
The Granger causality relationship of Price of Risk to News shocks, estimated
from the S&P 500 series, is even stronger in comparison and runs to 12 lags.
Table 4 on page 74 also reports Granger causality results from FTS to time-series,
which are similar to the Price of risk developed in this chapter in containing
information about Flight to Safety and which have been explored in literature
for capturing sentiments and uncertainty about investments. These are liquidity
spread between 1-year and 10-year yields (1y-10y), corporate bond spread (Baa-
Aaa), TFP total, TFP in Equipment, and Durables consumption [TFP(EqDur)]
and equipment and consumer durables share of total output (Inv Share). There
is significant Granger causality running from the Price of Risk series to these
alternate series. None of the series except for TFP in Equipment and Durables
consumption [TFP(EqDur)] series Granger causes the Price of risk, and even for
TFP(EqDur) series, the Granger causality is significant for lags greater than 3.
However, the Granger causality running from the Price of risk is significant even
for shorter lags.
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In Figure 19, the findings of this chapter are compared with the established
results from workhorse DSGE models equipped with investment technology and
risk premium shocks (Smets and Wouters, 2007). The impulse response impact
of adverse shocks to TFP, negative shocks to investment-specific technology, and
positive shock to risk premium in an updated 2019 model version of Smets and
Wouters (2007) are slow and less severe when compared with the impulse responses
to FTS shocks studied in this chapter. The impulse responses to Smets and
Wouters (2007) model also have the typical macroeconomic puzzles, such as a
negative correlation of output, consumption, and investment with hours, which
the results from the FTS shocks identified in this chapter seem to avoid.
The identified shocks from the benchmark configuration compare well against
the FTS and FTR obtained by alternate methods such as the Ordinal index
approach and the Threshold approach (Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei,
2013). Comparing the two methods with the identified shocks to the Price of
risk series of the benchmark VAR is made through scatter plots in Figure 20 on
page 77. It shows two interesting phenomena. Firstly, that during the (quarterly)
periods when the VAR identifies a positive shock to the Price of risk series, there is
also a higher likelihood of FTS days in those periods. And secondly, the likelihood
of Flight to Safety days is higher than Flight to Risk days’ likelihood. Obviously,
the measure of FTS and FTR likelihood, which are calculated using Threshold
(Appendix B.2) and Ordinal index (Appendix B.3) method are dependent on the
selected parameter (κ or k), and a higher choice of that parameter would limit the
likelihood of observing the extreme flight of capital in either direction (towards
risk or safety). For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to note that in
the Threshold method, the κ is chosen to be equal to 1, which results in 11% of
total days being classified as FTS, and in the Ordinal index method, a choice of k
is also equal to 1 gives 3.4% FTS days. Detailed methodology of finding the FTS
and the FTR days using the two methods is made in this chapter’s Appendix B.1.
A comparison of FTS and FTR days using the ordinal index method with k of
1, as shown in Figure 26 on page 119, also provide us more significant and more
frequent spikes during FTS days than during FTR days.
Lastly, we take a look at the correlation between the obtained shocks and
the data, which is presented in the correlogram [See Figure 21 on page 78].
This investigation shows that the benchmark model fitted with only FTS shocks
captures most of the correlation in data, which the model fitted with TFP shocks
only fails to do.
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Figure 20: FTS/FTR from Threshold and OI method
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Notes: Scatter plot comparing the median structural shocks to price of risk series from
benchmark VAR for period 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 (X-axis) with Quarterly average of
FTS probability and negative (neg.) of FTR probability values (both on Y-axis). The
FTS and FTR are calculated using Threshold method with κ = 1 in top figure and are
calculated using Ordinal index method with k = 1 in bottom figure. The calculations
are discussed in detail in Appendix B.1. FTS are only reported for quarters when
identified shocks were positive, while negative (neg.) of FTR are only reported for
quarters when identified shocks were negative.
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Figure 21: Correlogram of Data and Model with FTS and TFP shocks
Notes: Y-axis: Cross-Correlation of the growth rate of Consumption (dC), Output
(dY), Hours (dH) and Investment (dI) in US Data and the benchmark model fitted
with only Flight to safety (FTS) shocks and TFP shocks identified using Sign and
Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis: k lag lengths.
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7 Discussion
Our understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their propagation has come a
long way since the early days of C. A. Sims (1980) and Kydland and Prescott
(1982). Most of the US business cycles’ features have been well established in the
Real business cycle literature. Ramey (2016) has a detailed discussion on this
topic. The key results are that consumption is less volatile than output, output
is less volatile than investment, but output is similarly volatile to hours. The
US macroeconomic data series also shows co-movement and pro-cyclicality (Stock
and Watson, 1999). However, not so well established in the RBC literature is the
role of asset prices and the causes of business cycles (Rebelo, 2005).
The standard neoclassical paradigm of real business cycle models cannot ratio-
nalize the high expected risk premium observed in the US equity market returns
or the low risk-free rate in US bond returns. It has resulted in puzzles [for e.g.
Mehra (2003) and Donaldson and Mehra (2007) evaluate attempts to resolve
the ‘Equity premium puzzle’ since it was first introduced in Mehra and Prescott
(1985)].
With regards to our understanding of the nature and cause of business cycle
fluctuations, much progress has been made through structural vector autoregres-
sions and DSGE based research, but the literature is still inconclusive. This
section discusses the developments of the last two decades in explaining business
cycle fluctuations from the perspective of technology shocks, investment-adjusted
technology shocks, the marginal efficiency of investment shocks, financial shocks,
news shocks, information shocks, risk shocks, and uncertainty shocks, and com-
pares them in light of the results from FTS shocks, as identified in this chapter.
7.1 Neutral Technology shocks
The usual explanations for the cause of business cycles for a long time were policy
(monetary and fiscal) shocks and cost shocks. Kydland and Prescott (1982) added
technology shocks to the list, and the literature that followed controversially
attributed the cause of recessions to a fall in total factor productivity. These
technology shocks raised productivity in all factors of production (labour and
capital), which is why they are also known as neutral technology shocks.
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Galí (1999) fuelled the opposition to this thought of understanding recessions
as periods of technological regress. By identifying technology shocks as the only
source for long-term labor productivity changes in his model, he could show that
‘hours’ at least in the short run fell in response to technology shocks. King and
Rebelo (1999) and Baxter and King (1999) defend the RBC models by showing
pro-cyclicality of hours to output. Francis and Ramey (2006) reconstruct the US
historical data from WWII to find that technology shocks in later periods only
raise productivity gradually, and this gradual rise provides an inventive to reduce
hours in short-run for the anticipation of increasing hours in response to higher
productivity in the long-run. Like Galí (1999), Francis and Ramey (2005), too,
assume that hours have a unit root, and they show that their results are robust
to over-identification tests.
Nevertheless, the assumption of considering a unit root in hours per capita is
criticized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003), and they find that
Gali’s results fail if hours are used in levels instead of first-differences. Chari,
Kehoe, and Mcgrattan (2000) dispel Gali’s findings as being driven by measure-
ment error. By bringing additional methods Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
defended Gali’s results. They use hours per worker as a proxy for making uti-
lization adjustment to the Solow residual. This series is regularly updated and
made available online [see Fernald (2012)]. Shocks to this adjusted series lead
to a reduction in hours worked. In contrast, the vector autoregressions approach
by Alexopoulos (2011), using a new series based on books published in the field
of technology, finds that positive technology shocks lead to an increase in total
factor productivity, investment, and to an extent, hours. Unsettled, the debate
moves on to look for alternative explanations for business cycle fluctuations.
7.2 Investment-specific technology and MEI shocks
A prime alternative explanation to technology shocks is raised in investment-
specific technology shocks (IST). As the name suggests, the investment-specific
technological productivity shocks raise the productivity of only new capital (in-
vestment goods). The impact of a positive investment-specific technology shock
(IST) is visible in the price of additional investment, becoming lower in terms of
the price of consumption goods. It also increases the real rate of investment.
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and (2000) were the first to examine
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the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks and the investment-specific
technology (IST) shocks in calibrated DSGE models. They found them to account
for around 30% of the variation in output. Over the last decade, several influential
papers have argued that IST and MEI shocks are the key drivers of business cycles.
See Fisher (2006) for long run restrictions VAR, Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Lindé (2011) for structural VAR, Justiniano et al (2010, 2011) for DSGE
model and Araújo (2012) for emerging markets based evidence. Fisher (2006)
extends Galí (1999) by assuming that only IST shocks impact relative price of
investment and finds these shocks to explain more than 60% of variation in output
growth and hours. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) establish the role of
credit frictions in investment-specific technology shocks.
In models with an RBC core Barro and King (1984) conjecture (or curse) that
only technology shocks can account for the observed co-movement among out-
put, consumption, investment, and hours. They conjecture that after a positive
investment (IST or MEI) shock, there would be a tendency to raise investment
much higher than could be afforded by increasing labour effort. Therefore, any
difference between labour income and investment would have to be made up by
reducing consumption. This fall in consumption runs against the evidence of
pro-cyclicality of consumption with output in data. Therefore investment shocks
cannot be the primary driver of business cycles in models with inseparable pref-
erences and an RBC core. Justiniano et al (2010, 2011) overcome this curse by
including nominal and real rigidity in their model. Other researchers too, such as
Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), Furlan-
etto and Seneca (2014) have extended their models with capital utilization cost,
non-separable preferences, habits persistence, adjustment costs in intermediate
inputs and investments adjustment costs. Such extensions introduce some form
of real rigidity in their models to generate an explanatory power for investment
shocks.
Medium scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007), on the one hand,
confirms that productivity shocks have a negative short-run impact on hours
worked. This is consistent even for a flexible price economy as argued by Galí
(1999). However, on the other hand, they also raise doubts about the significance
of investment-specific technology shocks. ‘Demand’ shocks, which in their model
are captured via risk premium shock, exogenous spending, and investment-specific
technology shocks, explain significant variation in macro data but only in the short-
term. Whereas, only technology shocks explain most of the long-term variation
in data.
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In contrast, results from DSGE models of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tam-
balotti (2010) and (2011) show that investment shocks are the primary driving
force in output fluctuations. Their source of discrepancy with Smets and Wouters
(2007) results from the different ways in which they measure investment and
consumption in their models. They include durable goods consumption and
inventories into Investments. Consumption of durables goods has also been com-
monly included in the definition of investments by other estimated DSGE models
[See, Cooley and Prescott (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003)
and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007)]. Whereas, the Smets
and Wouters (2007) model, unlike Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)
and (2011), does not include inventories in investments but includes purchases of
consumer durable goods in consumption. Both durable goods consumption and
inventories are the more cyclical components of GDP (Stock and Watson, 2016)
and including durable goods consumption and inventories in investment makes
that investment series more volatile and procyclical.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) argue that it is the first of the
two changes they make that is significant in driving their results. The first
change they make to Smets and Wouters (2007) is by excluding durables goods
from consumption and including them into investment. This change is majorly
responsible for the increase in the variance decomposition at the business cycle
frequency, which is explained by the investment-specific technology shock in their
paper compared to Smets and Wouters (2007). Whereas in the case of the second
change, when Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) exclude inventories
from investment and move their investment series closer to Smets and Wouters
(2007) definition of investment, it leads to two changes. First, the investment shock
parameter becomes large, dampening investment shocks’ impact on investment,
output, and consumption. Second, the preference shock has less impact as there
is a weaker response from both output and consumption.
The understanding from investment and the marginal efficiency of investment
based literature is that investment-specific technology shocks explain most of the
variance in output at business cycle frequency. However, the case for investment
shocks as a significant contributor to business cycles, as shown in the significant
result of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) and (2011), seems less
convincing if we include financial frictions in the model.
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7.3 Financial frictions and Risk shocks
The rate at which investment goods are converted into consumption goods is
identified as the main driver of business cycles, but this rate of change is controlled
by the investment adjustment cost parameter in investment-specific technological
shocks models, such as Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). Investment
shocks are also linked to financial markets, and frictions in financial markets
determine the pace of conversion of investment goods into consumption goods.
Kamber, Smith, and Thoenissen (2015) exploit this feature by introducing a
collateral constraint (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) into Smets and Wouters (2007)
type of model and demonstrate that the ability of positive investment shocks in
raising entrepreneurial consumption is attenuated in the presence of collateral
constraints.
In the presence of binding collateral constraints, investment shocks’ ability as
a key driver of business cycles is diminished, and identification of robust invest-
ment specific structural shocks in DSGE models is difficult as per Kamber, Smith,
and Thoenissen (2015). They also show that with investment shocks, there is no
co-movement between consumption and output, going back to the original argu-
ment of Barro and King (1984). A positive investment shock lowers the relative
price of investment goods, Tobin’s Q. When the collateral constraint is binding,
the entrepreneur, due to a positive investment shock, loses her collateral value.
An increase in borrowing cannot finance a further increase in investment. There-
fore, the binding collateral constraint stalls entrepreneurs’ borrowing ability, and
additional investment can only be made by reducing entrepreneurial consumption.
Risk shocks replace the role of investment shocks in explaining the variance
in output data once borrowing constraints are included (as in Kamber, Smith,
and Thoenissen (2015)). Their estimated risk premium shock rises sharply at the
beginning of each post-war recession. The effective interest rate, as in Kamber,
Smith, and Thoenissen (2015) is highly counter-cyclical. In the presence of a
favourable risk shock, they find that there is an increase in investment demand.
A negative risk premium shock lowers households and entrepreneurs’ interest
cost, even for those investors for whom the borrowing constraint is binding. This
reduction in borrowing rates and lower debt-service cost allows them to undertake
additional capital purchases simultaneously, raise their consumption, and avoid
the co-movement puzzle of consumption not being pro-cyclical with output. An
increase in Tobin’s Q following a favourable risk shock loosens the borrowing
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constraint and further amplifies this mechanism. In this manner, we can see
that as financial frictions are included, the significance of Investment specific
technology shocks is reduced, and that of risk premium shocks is improved.
Similar mechanisms in Christensen and Dib (2008) and Merola (2015), which
include an external finance premium that is impacted by firms’ net worth, suggest
that the variance decomposition contribution of Investment specific shocks is
reduced in the presence of financial frictions. In a related paper, Nolan and
Thoenissen (2009) describe that shocks to the financial sector in the form of
entrepreneurial net worth play a significant role in business cycles, much more
than TFP or monetary shocks, and these shocks are negatively correlated with
external finance premium. Equity payouts are pro-cyclical, while debt payouts are
countercyclical for US firms, as studied by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). They
also show that events originating in the financial sector end up tightening firms’
financing conditions and are quantitatively crucial in explaining the dynamics
of real and financial variables and contributing to the great recession of 2007-08.
Amano and Shukayev (2012) show that risk premium shocks are particularly
important in driving the economy to ZLB.
DSGE model in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) through agency
problems of asymmetric information and costly monitoring (like Townsend (1979)
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)) introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty
to the way entrepreneurs can convert raw capital into useful capital. Entrepreneurs
pay a premium to borrow capital. This premium represents the riskiness of bet on
each entrepreneur. By estimating their model using macroeconomic and financial
variables, they conclude that shocks to the volatility of idiosyncratic uncertainty
or risk shocks account for most fluctuations in GDP at business cycle frequency.
The risk shocks-based view of business cycles is compelling; however, in DSGE
models without some form of financial frictions, it gets challenging to disengage
between risk shocks and the marginal efficiency of investment shocks.
7.4 News and Uncertainty shocks
The hypothesis that future technology expectations play an important role in
driving business cycles was formalized in Beaudry and Portier (2004). By using
stock prices as the basis for forming expectations about future economic conditions
and by using two sequential identification schemes; first which makes innovations
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to stock prices orthogonal to TFP shocks, and second which drives the long term
movement in TFP, Beaudry and Portier (2006) demonstrate that their news-
driven shocks anticipate TFP growth by a couple of years. Beaudry and Portier
(2005), Beaudry and Lucke (2010), Beaudry, Dupaigne, and Portier (2011) reach
similar conclusions. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) in a DSGE model further
posit that news shocks about economic fundamentals generate comovement in
aggregate productivity and account for comovement in sectoral productivity as
well. However, in a different VAR scheme by identifying news shocks as orthogonal
to technology innovation and one which maximizes future variation in technology,
Barsky and E. R. Sims (2009) show that the positive wealth effect generated from
positive news about future productivity cannot lead to an expansion in RBC
models. The increase in consumption and leisure from the wealth effect leads
to a fall in output and hours. Suppose instead, because of the high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, the real rate of return effect dominates. In that case,
investment and hours increase, but the increase in output does not compensate
for the increase in investment, and so consumption falls.
The strength of the news-driven business cycle is also challenged when con-
sidering the significant relation between periods of economic downturn and high
uncertainty. The volatility of the stock market or GDP is an often-used mea-
sure of uncertainty. This volatility surges during recessions. However, this surge
cannot be explained by a measure of bad news or an increase in risk aversion
(during recessions) alone. Only 1 of the 17 instances of volatility jumps from 1962
to 2008 that lowered the expected GDP growth and led to an increase in eco-
nomic uncertainty was due to ‘bad news’ (Bloom, 2009). It is not surprising then
that the macroeconomic research since the Global financial crisis has emphasized
considering uncertainty, volatility, information, and sentiment-based shocks to
understand the business cycle fluctuations.
On the one hand, uncertainty negatively impacts growth and spending. Romer
(1990) says uncertainty near the Global Depression is responsible for a fall in
durable consumer spending. In an influential paper Bloom (2009) depicts the
cyclical variation in the standard deviation of firm-level stock returns, which he
calls as uncertainty, to be an important determinant of business cycles. Uncer-
tainty results in cautious decision-making on behalf of firms, as they deliberate
on hiring and investment decisions since adjustment costs make those decisions
expensive to reverse. It also results in cautious decision-making on behalf of con-
sumers, as during high uncertainty, they delay consumption, especially of durable
goods. Both these responses also reduce the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy.
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On the other hand, negative growth creates uncertainty. Period of negative
growth, or recessions, also raise uncertainty by slowing down trading activity,
difficult forecasting ability, policy miscommunication, and hyper-activism. Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2016) show that due to slackness in business activity, there
is an increase in micro-level uncertainty since businesses try out new ideas for
the reason that they are now cheaper to try. Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson
(2017) using consumption and growth data from 16 OECD countries find that
periods of lower growth have high fluctuations in long-run volatility. Income and
wages, especially for low-wage earners, show volatility surge during recessions.
Contrary to traditional business cycle models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982),
the uncertainty based results from Bloom (2014) and Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2016) further provide evidence that a fall in productivity is an effect of an
increase in uncertainty, rather than a response to technological regress. They find
that increase in uncertainty has a chilling effect on the productivity-enhancing
reallocation of high productivity and low productivity firms. As uncertainty
increases, high productivity firms do not want to be aggressive in their productivity
allocation, and low productivity firms do not want to cut back on their aggressive
propositions. We know that the reallocation of resources tends to drive most of the
observed productivity growth. Therefore this hiatus in productivity reallocation
during high uncertainty stalls productivity growth and such a stalling effect of
uncertainty underlies the theory of uncertainty driven business cycle.
Uncertainty driven business cycle hypothesis finds support from micro-level
evidence of Panousi and Papanikolaou (2011), which discusses the impact of CEO
level decision making from an increase in uncertainty. CEOs do not make risky
investments if their net worth is tied to or highly exposed to the firm’s equity
valuation and its risk valuation. The structural model in Bloom (2014) estimates
that an average uncertainty shock has reduced the GDP by 1.3%. The uncertainty
after the great recession was thrice as compared to previous uncertainty shocks.
So around 3-4% of the fall in GDP during GFC could be attributed to uncertainty.
A sudden increase in uncertainty due to natural disasters, terrorist events explain
about 50% of the variation in output (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016) following
the event.
Arguably, the business cycle impact of uncertainty is limited only for the
short term (Bloom, 2014). In the short run, investment and output reduce, but
as uncertainty is reduced and once pent-up demand increases, an increase in
hiring and investment leads to a rebound. Similarly, Stein and Stone (2010) show
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uncertainty accounts for a third of the fall in capital investment during 2008-10.
However, uncertainty also seems to increase spending in R&D. Many new ventures
are undertaken in uncertain times because there are more avenues for growth but
less certainty about which avenues would be successful. The recent surge in R&D
activity to devise a vaccine that eradicates this Covid-19 virus is one example.
7.5 Reconciling Business cycles with Flight to Safety
In a nutshell, various attempts undertaken over the past three decades to explain
the co-movement in macroeconomic variables through business cycles have been
successful in some parts. They have led to inconsistencies and puzzles in oth-
ers. Neutral technology shocks explain most of the fluctuations for output and
consumption but do not account for their co-movement with hours. Investment-
related technology shocks using real frictions in the transformation of raw capital
into meaningful capital can break the Barro-King (1984) curse, explain most of
the output fluctuations, and reconcile hours to business cycles, but the results
diminish in the presence of financial frictions. Agency cost, collateral constraints,
asymmetric information, and risk-based models explain co-movements in busi-
ness cycles. However, there is difficulty in specifying structural shocks robust to
modest changes in these financial frictions. Expectations and uncertainty shocks
are promising indicators of the future economic climate and driving economic
fluctuations, but their impact on business cycles is mostly limited to the short
run.
As presented in this chapter, the research on business cycles showcases - Flight
to Safety - shocks as the major driver of economic fluctuations in the long run.
There is a striking similarity between an increase in uncertainty and Flight to
Safety. An increase in uncertainty leads to precautionary savings, which reduces
consumption (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) and leads to Flight to Safety. Some of
this increase in savings also flies abroad, as Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2009)
show that an increase in uncertainty can lead to a flight of capital from small
and open economies to larger and more closed ones, such as the United States.
Greater uncertainty leads to higher default risk, an increase in risk premia, and
makes ambiguity averse investors (Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini, 1999) act as if
the worst possible outcome is expected to occur. If uncertainty led expectations
are the key drivers of investment rationale and business cycles fluctuations, then
one mechanism where the impact of uncertainty is immediately reflected is FTS.
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Figure 22: Contribution from sentiment variables
Notes: Investment growth in data (thin solid line in all charts, %y/y) in comparison with the
investment series fitted with shocks identified from Sign and Zero restrictions discussed in
Strategy 1. Data: 1985:Q1 to 2019:Q3. The benchmark configuration of the model identifies
‘FTS’ shocks as disturbances to ‘Price of Risk’ series. In other iterations of the model this is
replaced with other interesting proxies for consumer expectations/sentiment and results from
shocks to that replacement series of interest are reported. Such as: ‘EPU’ is Baker, Bloom,
and Davis (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty index. ‘1y-10y spread’ is liquidity spread
on US 1 year and10 year T-bills. ‘Rel.Px Cons to Eq.’ is Relative price of Consumption to
price of Equipment. ‘Util-Adj TFP (Eq+Dur)’ is the Utilisation-adjusted TFP in producing
Equipment and Consumer Durables. ‘Baa-Aaa’ is the spread on corporate bonds rated Aaa
and Baa. ‘Rel.Px Inv+DurCons’ is the Relative price of Durables Consumption and Investment
to Consumption of Non-Durables and Services. ‘Eq.+Dur’ share is the share of Equipment
and Consumer Durables to Output. ‘Cons. Sentiment’ is US Consumer Sentiment indicator.
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Measures of uncertainty developed in the last decade are at best proxies of
the central phenomenon; one additional potent measure to that list could be FTS.
Figure 22 on page 88 describes the growth of US investment series that can be
explained by shocks to other comparable series. These alternate time-series are
similar to the Price of risk developed in this chapter in containing information
about Flight to Safety and which have been explored in literature for capturing
sentiments, uncertainty, and risk aversion pertaining to investments.
The thick solid lines in that figure represent variables that closely resemble the
contribution to Investment growth made by FTS shocks. Shocks to investment-
related variables series that are used in investment-specific TFP shocks literature,
such as the TFP in Equipment and Durables consumption [TFP(EqDur)], and the
Relative price of Investment and Durables Consumption to price of Consumption
of Non-Durables and Services (Rel.Px Inv+DurC). These shocks exhibit higher
contribution to deviation in investment growth. In comparison shocks related
to consumer sentiment and liquidity spread between 1-year and 10-year yields
(1y-10y) show lower contribution. There is also a similarity in results from the
corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) as
both these series reflect the impact of Flight to Safety. The significant Granger
causality (which we have already noticed in table 4 on page 74) running from
Price of Risk series to these alternate series reassures the faith in pursuing Flight
to Safety as germane to understanding the nature of business cycles.
The main finding of this paper is to show that Flight to Safety has a long
term impact on the economy. Flight to Safety shocks can also provide additional
fillip of generating a long-term impact on the economy, which is missing in the
uncertainty based literature. It would be interesting to establish the relevance of
Flight to Safety through an estimated DSGE model, which has a safe and risky
investment technology and a precautionary mechanism for investors to allocate
between those two. That would be a fascinating avenue for future research.
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8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter’s central conviction is to identify the role of Flight to Safety as the
critical driver of business cycle fluctuations. It achieves so by using a Price of risk
series that measures the price differential of a safe and risky asset in a five variable
structural vector autoregressions model identified using Uhlig (2005) sign based
restrictions. The results show that Flight to Safety shocks predate any regress
in total factor productivity by several years. Flight to Safety shocks can account
for more than 50% of fluctuations in macroeconomic variables at business cycle
frequency. This analysis is robust to small alterations in the identification strategy
and excluding the post-Global financial crisis period data from this investigation.
FTS shocks have gained a more prominent role in the past three decades as
expectations formation, and policy communication has improved in that time.
Flight to Safety shocks lead to a long and sustained decline in investment-
related macroeconomic variables, the mechanism with which they can achieve
so asks several questions from the established tenets of business cycle dynamics.
Various business cycle researchers at different stages have posited neutral tech-
nology, investment-specific technology, financial frictions, among others, as the
main reason for economic fluctuations. Recently there is a focus on looking at
expectations formation, in the form of news shocks and uncertainty shocks, as the
main drivers of business cycles. This chapter proposes an alternative view that
shocks to investor risk aversion lead to booms and busts in business cycles.
A typical FTS episode is signified by a sudden increase in appetite for safe
assets with respect to risky investments. The notion that during times of uncer-
tainty, economic agents change their behaviour, by exhibiting caution towards
consumption and increasing their savings is quite old and one of the defining
reasons for the study of macroeconomics. How FTS shocks impact the long term
fluctuations in business cycle variables inclines us to support the view that Flight
to Safety works through the Expectations channel. Rational, risk-averse investors,
in response to an increase in uncertainty about their future income and employ-
ment, exhibit precautionary behaviour to increase savings today to smooth out
their consumption path and alleviate the impact of realization of a bad state in
the future. Investors smooth their consumption by shifting long term savings
from risky to safer assets. Such a shift by a large number of people leads to a drop
in macroeconomic activity that is visible through a fall in output, investment,
productivity, hours, consumption, and in a broader economic gloom.
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One of the primary motivations for pursuing this empirical exercise was search-
ing for explanations for the unprecedented fall in output and the long-term decline
in investment after the global financial crisis. Through identification and evidence
posted, we can safely say that the surge in FTS episodes over the last two decades
is a crucial variable of significance in understanding business cycles. The explana-
tory power of FTS is promising and stands in contrast to the ineffectiveness of
standard measures of productivity, sentiment, and expectations in explaining the
slow recovery post-global financial crisis. This chapter has merely scratched the
surface of the possible channels in which the Flight to Safety mechanism impacts
both closed and open economies. There has been another surge in risk aversion
during the Covid-19 phase, and therefore improved understanding of the Flight
to Safety mechanism would be useful in making effective policies for recovery.
In particular, what would be interesting to look out for in future research is an
estimated micro-founded DSGE model with the causes and effects of the Flight
to Safety phenomenon.
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A Numerical approach to sign restrictions
Uhlig (2005) shows that a ∈ Rm is an impulse vector iff a is a column of A such
that A is a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix Σ = AA′ (see Equ.
6). Let ÃÃ′ be a Cholesky decomposition of Σ, then a is an impulse vector iff
a = Ãα (22)
for some vector α of unit length. Let ri(k) ∈ Rm be the vector response at k
horizon to ith shock in Cholesky decomposition of Σ. Then the impulse response
to a is given by
ra(k) =
m
∑
i=1
αiri(k) (23)
Given some B = [B′(1), ....,B
′
(l)], variance-covariance matrix Σ and some K period
ahead forecast horizon after the shock, we need to obtain A(B,Σ, K) the set of all
such impulse vectors. One approach is to use the OLS estimate of VAR, B = B̂
and Σ = Σ̂, for a few choices of K. Monte-Carlo methods can be applied to pick
impulse vectors that lie in set A and obey the sign restrictions. The maximum
and minimum of those impulse responses can be plot to get an estimate of the
bounds of the impulse responses. Analytically Uhlig (2005) discusses a way of
making inference on these impulse responses, by making the following assumption.
Assumption A.1. Let Ã(Σ) be the lower-triangular Cholesky factorisation of Σ.
Let Pm be the space of positive-definite m×m matrices and Sm be the unit sphere
in Rm, Sm = {α ∈ Rm : ||α|| = 1}. The parameters (B,Σ, α) are jointly drawn
from a prior on Rl×m×m×Pm×Sm. For both criteria function and sign-restrictions
approach, this prior is proportional to a Normal-Wishart prior in (B,Σ) whenever
the impulse vector a = Ã(Σ)α satisfies a ∈ A(B,Σ, K) and zero elsewhere.
If we make this assumption, the impulse vector is parameterized in A(B,Σ, α)
space rather than A(B,Σ, a) space. So the prior is proportional to the Normal-
Wishart prior times an indicator function on Ã(Σ)α ∈ A(B,Σ, K). Therefore,
the posterior is given by usual posterior on (B,Σ) times the indicator function
Ã(Σ)α ∈ A(B,Σ, K).
To draw inference (in the sign-restrictions approach) from this posterior, jointly
draw from unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for (B,Σ) as well as a uniform
distribution over the unit sphere α ∈ Sm. Construct impulse vector using (22) and
calculate impulse responses ra(k, j) for k = 1, 2...K horizons, for the j variables
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(which are restricted in sign for the K horizon periods). If all the impulse responses
obey sign restrictions, keep the draw, otherwise discard it. Repeat sufficiently
(for 200 times) and do inference on the draws kept.
In the criteria function approach, a penalty function f(j) is written which
penalises the impulse response of a variable in the expected direction (positive
or negative after the shock) significantly less than what it penalises the response
in the opposite of expected direction. The impulse vector a is then defined as
the vector that minimises the total penalty function ψ(a) which is the sum of
all impulse responses for all variables (of interest) to the shock. Calculating the
impulse response in this way requires numerical minimisation. Save both the draw
which is made from the Normal-Wishart prior on (B,Σ) and the resulting impulse
vector for statistical analysis. In order to obtain inference in this approach, make
Assumption A.1 and use Monte-Carlo method to pick n = 100 draws from it. Do
numerical minimisation of the total penalty function ψ(a) on each draw and save
the results.
B High-frequency approach to FTS
The structural VAR analysis of the FTS shocks on the macroeconomy has iden-
tified the FTS shocks for the benchmark model with respect to identification
strategy 1. In this section, I discuss another method from the literature that
have been considered in generating FTS series. This comparative analysis follows
from Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) in defining FTS as days of
high stress and high volatility in asset markets that coincide with days of neg-
ative stock-bond return correlation where equity returns are negative and bond
returns are positive. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) used a plethora
of econometric techniques to develop specific measures of FTS. Based on daily
returns data of benchmark equity index (risky asset) and benchmark 10-yr trea-
sury bond (safe and liquid asset) they have found that on average FTS days are
less than 3% of the sample (trading days between 1980 to 2013 of 23 developed
countries), and that bond returns exceed equity returns by 2.5 to 4% on FTS
days.
One of their techniques is to develop a continuous signal between interval [0, 1]
that signifies the probability or likelihood of FTS occurring on that day. This
measure identifies FTS as a day of occurrence of extremely negative stock return
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and simultaneously an extremely positive bond return. Therefore, for country i
FTS is given by
FTSi,t = ✶{r
b
i,t > zi,b} x ✶{r
s
i,t > zi,s} (24)
where ✶ is the indicator function, rbi,t, r
s
i,t are country specific return on bond and
stocks index, and zi,b, zi,s are time-varying country specific thresholds that are
directly related to time varying volatility of bond/equity returns. The key variable
in derivation of the FTS days then is the time-varying threshold parameters, zb,
zs that is k standard deviations from time-varying volatilites σb,t, σs,t.
zb = kσb,t and zs = kσs,t (25)
There are a couple of methods that can be used to generate this time-varying
volatility of stock and bond prices. A common approach is to fit a Garch (1,1)
on the daily return series. This approach is based on using the Gaussian kernel,
which treats both past and future observations as equally significant in generating
the volatility of any given date. This paper instead relies on Baele, Bekaert,
Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019) approach that identifies the time-varying long and
short-run volatility by employing backwards-looking Gaussian kernel density esti-
mator7. For long-run volatility estimation, a normal density kernel is used over
past 255 (i.e. near 1 year of trading days), and the weights on the previous 5 days
are ignored. The short-run volatility is estimated by using the backwards-looking
kernel over the last 5 days (i.e. 1 week of trading days). The volatility is modelled
using a simple kernel method is discussed in the next subsection.
B.1 Kernel density based conditional volatility
Kernel methodology from Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019) for finding
the short and long run variances and covariances is reproduced for the avid reader.
Given any date t0 in a sample t = 1, ..., T . The kernel method calculates the
variances of returns ri,t at a normalised date, τ = t0/T ∈ [0, 1] as
σ2i,τ =
T
∑
t=1
Kh(t/T − τ)r
2
i,t i = s, b (26)
where the weights Kh(z) = K(z/h)/h are dependent on how close the observations
are to the point of interest τ , the size of chosen bandwidth h > 0, and the specific
7Page 5 of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013)
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functional form of kernel density estimator. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and
Wei (2019) suggest the following backward looking Gaussian Kernel.
K(z) =
ψ
2
exp
(
z2
2
)
if z ≤
t− l
T
(27)
K(z) = 0 if z >
t− l
T
(28)
The scaling factor ψ is used to make the weights sum to 100% and l is the
number of past days that are ignored in the variance calculation. For long-run
variances, a bandwidth h of 255 days is chosen, and the last 5 observations (l = 5)
are ignored. In short-run variances the size of h is 5 days and no observations
are ignored, (l = 0). The time-varying short and long-run covariance between
equity and bond return is calculated using the same Kernel density estimator
to the cross-product of bond and equity returns. The time-varying correlation
between these assets is then given by the ratio of the stock-bond covariance to
the product of stock and bond volatilities. Once the time-varying volatilities and
covariances are determined, we proceed in the next section to generate an FTS
incidence indicator by using either a Threshold-based or an Ordinal rank-based
approach. Figure 7 on page 21 highlights the results from short and long-run
variance and covariance produced from the backwards-looking Kernel methods.
A comparison between this nuanced backwards-looking Kernel-based method and
a trivial alternative Rolling days method is made in Figure 23 on page 116. The
rolling days method chooses past 250 days of returns for calculating long run
time-varying volatility and chooses past 5 days of returns for calculating the short
run time-varying volatility. The rolling days method places equal weights to all
past observations and therefore has higher peaks and lower troughs.
B.2 Threshold approach to FTS
The first approach to identify FTS days is based on the coexeedance approach
in Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) that studies contagion across
emerging markets by counting joint occurrences of extreme (or beyond a certain
threshold) events. The significance of the events is compared to what would be
expected under certain normal distributions.
Denote rt = (re,t,−rb,t) as the series of observed equity returns and negative
of observed bond returns. The change of sign of the bond return observation
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is crucial. Recall that the FTS event is marked by a joint observation of bond
returns being above a defined positive threshold and equity returns being below
a defined negative threshold. If such a cumulative density function under the
assumption of joint normality between stock and negative of bond returns were
to be plotted on a two-dimensional grid with equity returns on the horizontal
axis and the negative of bond returns on the vertical axis. It would showcase an
FTS event to be lying in the bottom left, or south-west corner also known as the
third quadrant of the two-axis coordinate system. Assuming that both equity
and bond returns are normally distributed, with mean zero, so ri,t ∼ N(0,Ωt). In
this joint normal distribution the cumulative probability of a threshold that is set
equal to negative (κ) times the standard deviation of the respective equity and
bond returns is given as,
Probths,t = Ncdf




−κσe,t
−κσb,t

 , 0,Ωt

 (29)
where the variance-covariance matrix Ωt consists of the variances of bond and eq-
uity return, σe,t and σb,t are respective time-varying volatilities, and the covariance
between equity and negative of bond returns ρ(e,−b),t is,
Ωt =


σ2e,t ρ(e,−b),t
ρ(e,−b),t σ
2
b,t

 (30)
The threshold κ can be calibrated to deliver on a targeted number of events that
are considered extreme or demonstrate FTS. An observation is considered extreme
(or demonstrates FTS) when the Probobs,t is less than Probths,t, i.e. the observed
equity returns and negative of bond returns are below the threshold,
Probobs,t < Probths,t = Prob


re,t < −κσe,t
−rb,t < −κσb,t

 (31)
Therefore the probability of FTS in the threshold method can be calculated as
FTSt = ✶{rb,t > 0} x ✶{rs,t < 0} x ✶{Probobs,t < Probths,t} x (1 − Probobs,t)
(32)
where the first term checks if the bond returns are positive, the second term
checks if the stock return is negative and the third indicator function marks
extreme events, i.e. when the cumulative probability of the event is lower than
the cumulative probability of the threshold event. Once a day is deemed to have
exhibit FTS, the last term puts a higher probability to more extreme events. So
for a threshold probability of 0.04, only an observation that has strictly negative
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stock return, strictly positive bond return and has a cumulative probability density
of Probobs < 0.04 can be counted as an FTS event. The FTS probability of that
date is then set to be 1 − Probobs, which will be greater than 0.96.
Whether an event would be extreme enough to be characterised as an FTS
depends on the threshold κ, for instance, if we choose the threshold κ to be equal
to 1.25 (time-varying) standard deviation below the mean equity or negative bond
return, this would lead to a higher number of FTS days than we would get by
setting a threshold κ of 2.0. Figure 24 on page 117 plots the FTS incidence,
calculated using the Threshold method, for different choices of the threshold
(κ). In fig. 24, the threshold probability is time-varying as it depends on the
time-varying volatilities of stock and bond returns.
B.3 Ordinal index approach to FTS
Another way to identify FTS using kernel density based measure of time-varying
volatility of returns and a threshold criteria, is the Ordinal index approach. This
alternative method is based on Kremer, Lo Duca, and Holló (2012) composite
measure of determining stress in financial system. Their method generates the
composite index by aggregating the empirical (ranked) cumulative probability
distribution over several indicators. So far, we have used the definition of FTS as
the extreme chance of generating excess positive bond returns and excess negative
equity returns. To this, using Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019), we
can be added several other features of the market that accompany any FTS event,
such as:
Strong features:
a) the size of difference between bond and equity return,
b) the dip in the difference between long and short run stock-bond correlation,
c) the spike in the difference between short term and long term equity return
volatility.
and Weak features:
d) strictly negative bond return and strictly positive equity return,
e) short-term bond equity return correlation is negative and strictly below the
long-term level,
f) ratio of short term to long term equity volatility is above a threshold k such
that k > 1.
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Once we have the time-varying long and short term volatility, the value of
these six features for any day in the sample can be easily calculated using daily
stock and bond market returns. The three strong features are all continuous
data and are structured so that a high values occurs on days of FTS. The three
weak features are binary, indicating whether the feature is achieved or not on any
day in the sample, these are expected to take their ‘true’ value for FTS days. A
combination of these results can be used to develop a continuous series of FTS
likelihood for any day in the sample.
The procedure begins by generating ordinal ranks for each observation on each
of the three strong features in the entire sample. The ordinal rankings for each
feature are normalised to be ∈ [0, 1]. Thereafter a composite rank ∈ [0, 1] for
each day in the sample is obtained by averaging its ranking on the three strong
features. Therefore an ordinal incidence rank of 0.9 or of 90% for a day in our
sample signifies that only 10% of the total days in the sample have higher average
ordinal rank than that particular day. This ordinal number can be read as a
FTS likelihood series, where the closer the averaged rank gets to 1, the higher
is the likelihood of FTS event occurring on that day. This estimate of the FTS
likelihood can be futher improved by considering the weak features of FTS days.
Consider the Ordinal rank of all days that satisfy the weak symptoms of FTS,
and consider the lowest of these ranks as a threshold. All days in the sample with
ordinal rank below the rank of threshold are allocated an FTS probability of zero.
The FTS probability of the threshold is assigned as 1 minus the probability of its
‘false positives’. In order to obtain the ‘false positives’ for the threshold number,
first determine the number of days in the sample that have an ordinal rank larger
than the rank of the threshold, and then calculate the percentage of those days
that fail to satisfy all of the three weak symptoms of FTS. Similarly we could
rely on the weak features to obtain FTS probability measure for the observations
that have an ordinal rank above the ordinal rank of threshold. FTS Probability
of those observations is also equal to one minus the probability of observing their
‘false positives’.
For instance, suppose that the ordinal rank on 3rd Aug 2018 is 0.7 which is
greater than the ordinal rank of threshold 0.62 for that day. And of the 300 days
in the sample that have an ordinal rank above 0.7, near 23% fail to satisfy all
three weak features of FTS, then the ‘false positive’ probability of 3rd Aug 2018
is 23% and its FTS probability is given by (1 − 23%) = 67%.
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The choice of threshold in this setup is determined by the lowest ordinal rank
that satisfies the 3 weak features, however the third of those weak features involves
subjectivity in the choice of k > 1, i.e. the ratio of short to long term equity
volatility should be above k on FTS days, where k could be any number greater
than 1 that could be chosen by the researcher. Based on different choices of k,
Figure 25 on page 118 plots the FTS incidences and their probabilities.
B.4 FTS and FTR days
The results of the threshold approach are presented for various levels of threshold
κ in fig. 24, and the results from the ordinal approach are presented in fig. 25.
In both these approaches as we increase the threshold criteria (κ or Probths or
k), there is a decrease in FTS days. Therefore to obtain the desired level of FTS
likelihood, a relevant threshold can be calibrated.
The daily FTS series is aggregated to generate a monthly and quarterly series.
The charts in Figure 27 describe this aggregation for the Ordinal index approach
for k = 1.25. While it is straightforward to interpret the frequency charts in
fig. 27, as the total number of FTS events that occurred in a given time frame,
interpreting the quarterly aggregate of FTS probability as given in fig. 27 can be a
bit confusing, but it is relevant to get the full incidence and impact of FTS events
that may be missing from an aggregated series that is only based on frequency.
In a frequency-based aggregation, a quarter with 4 FTS events is weighted higher
than a quarter with 3 FTS events. However, it is possible that the 3 FTS events
were all very extreme occurrences while the 4 FTS events were mild. Therefore
an aggregate measure that sums up the extremity of FTS events is required. One
approach to achieve this is by aggregating the sums of FTS probability in each
quarter and dividing it by 62.5, which is the number of trading days in a quarter.
This gives us a measure of the likelihood or probability of FTS days in that
quarter.
Based on this aggregation we witness from both the heatmaps (in fig. 6 on page
19 and the bubbles chart in fig. 27 on page 120) that there is a higher likelihood
of FTS cases in periods surrounding the events of global market distress, such as
the inflation of 70s, the Russia, Tequilla and Asian crisis, the Dot-com bubble
and the Great Recession. There is also an upsurge in FTS events and probability
in the last 5 years.
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Similarly, we can run a complimentary exercise using the same methods,
i.e. the ordinal index and the threshold approach to generate a Flight to Risk
(FTR) variable. This can be achieved by considering periods when the return
on equity index is positive and return on the bond index is negative, and this
difference is above a threshold when using the threshold method, or if using
the Ordinal method, the ordinal ranking of such days lies is in tails of a fitted
cumulative probability distribution. A comparison of FTS and FTR days using
the ordinal index method with threshold k of 1, as shown in Figure 26 on page
119 , demonstrates that incidence of both FTS and FTR events has increased
since the late 1990s and that FTS events have bigger and more frequent spikes
than FTR.
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Table 5: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 1
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
12.97 17.51 13.08 7.67 9.26
(1.46, 44.78) (2.47, 49.93) (1.45, 45.92) (0.89, 32.67) (0.81, 40.68)
4
9.39 38.13 9.62 11.46 8.00
(1.77, 34.73) (8.38, 64.47) (1.89, 26.36) (1.73, 35.46) (2.00, 30.86)
8
7.54 37.35 8.69 13.96 8.92
(1.22, 30.02) (6.29, 64.09) (1.75, 22.89) (2.35, 38.12) (2.16, 30.59)
12
7.75 40.45 8.39 11.80 8.21
(1.69, 31.57) (8.90, 66.37) (1.61, 20.80) (2.15, 35.60) (2.02, 28.34)
16
8.64 42.46 7.76 11.15 7.93
(2.15, 32.39) (10.77, 66.06) (1.94, 20.29) (2.17, 34.50) (1.95, 26.81)
20
9.25 42.77 7.63 10.97 7.77
(2.69, 33.52) (11.45, 65.29) (2.16, 20.13) (2.44, 34.26) (2.27, 26.13)
24
9.82 42.53 7.71 11.00 7.91
(2.93, 33.87) (11.86, 64.32) (2.49, 20.16) (2.60, 33.54) (2.34, 25.81)
28
10.17 42.17 8.04 11.03 8.01
(3.17, 33.64) (12.16, 63.72) (2.75, 20.16) (2.80, 32.99) (2.47, 25.58)
30
10.22 41.99 8.16 11.05 8.11
(3.37, 33.64) (12.27, 63.50) (2.94, 20.21) (2.82, 32.74) (2.48, 25.50)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 1. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table 6: FEVD of Investment in Great Moderation period
1
10.56 10.62 19.96 11.90 11.44
(0.72, 42.80) (1.24, 30.78) (3.09, 66.15) (0.65, 38.26) (0.70, 41.78)
4
9.18 20.23 14.90 13.40 12.41
(2.05, 34.70) (5.44, 48.47) (3.43, 41.11) (2.56, 44.71) (1.94, 34.98)
8
7.86 24.51 14.38 12.04 10.33
(1.29, 35.73) (5.46, 57.31) (3.15, 37.26) (1.92, 42.57) (1.23, 32.53)
12
7.84 24.18 14.51 11.84 10.62
(1.09, 35.76) (5.14, 56.29) (3.30, 38.31) (1.82, 42.67) (1.47, 32.39)
16
8.27 24.18 15.97 12.27 10.73
(1.51, 35.47) (4.78, 54.72) (3.85, 38.15) (2.13, 41.80) (1.86, 33.13)
20
8.62 23.51 16.84 12.14 10.67
(2.20, 36.61) (4.57, 53.21) (4.65, 39.58) (2.94, 40.57) (2.55, 31.64)
24
9.62 22.70 17.59 12.77 10.81
(3.08, 35.45) (4.60, 51.32) (5.60, 39.82) (3.57, 39.84) (3.34, 31.11)
28
10.63 21.70 17.62 12.52 11.84
(3.84, 34.26) (4.53, 49.54) (6.58, 39.68) (3.97, 39.09) (4.08, 31.35)
30
10.97 21.37 17.74 12.77 11.81
(4.11, 33.72) (4.53, 48.56) (6.84, 39.41) (4.18, 39.17) (4.44, 31.55)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model in
Great Moderation period data (1983-2007) identified with Identification Strategy
1. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table 7: FEVD of Investment in Pre-Great Moderation period
1
8.78 7.45 14.98 23.12 16.82
(2.14, 23.52) (0.61, 25.97) (1.02, 48.08) (2.73, 57.36) (1.22, 47.26)
4
5.50 9.67 8.56 32.62 21.52
(3.11, 15.10) (1.82, 34.20) (1.47, 29.15) (5.28, 57.94) (4.79, 56.39)
8
18.76 6.32 5.86 29.73 25.60
(12.32, 27.66) (1.32, 21.99) (2.35, 23.02) (9.04, 50.18) (8.14, 49.35)
12
27.13 5.68 5.69 26.08 24.57
(15.84, 36.87) (1.21, 19.14) (2.44, 20.88) (8.40, 45.55) (8.57, 43.53)
16
27.22 5.80 6.21 25.54 25.10
(15.25, 37.94) (1.53, 18.98) (3.15, 20.05) (8.36, 45.12) (8.60, 43.74)
20
27.25 5.79 6.33 25.05 26.26
(14.67, 38.51) (1.67, 18.65) (3.46, 19.55) (8.39, 45.11) (8.89, 44.67)
24
27.96 5.69 6.21 24.54 26.61
(14.41, 39.69) (1.64, 18.12) (3.46, 18.76) (8.32, 44.81) (8.87, 46.03)
28
28.52 5.57 6.24 24.28 26.50
(14.32, 40.98) (1.59, 17.63) (3.50, 17.95) (8.35, 44.32) (9.14, 45.79)
30
28.65 5.56 6.32 24.16 26.57
(14.27, 41.36) (1.57, 17.42) (3.48, 17.63) (8.38, 44.55) (9.29, 46.45)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model in pre
Great Moderation period data (1954-1978) identified with Identification Strategy 1.
Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table 8: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 2
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
7.31 15.18 23.61 12.34 4.19
(0.34, 32.83) (2.36, 51.54) (2.62, 72.04) (0.93, 38.08) (0.52, 17.76)
4
23.55 16.18 19.95 11.15 5.66
(7.08, 47.50) (2.99, 43.74) (3.63, 50.98) (2.71, 33.19) (1.65, 21.85)
8
25.32 11.75 21.49 11.89 6.74
(5.24, 48.81) (1.70, 36.50) (3.10, 47.29) (1.99, 35.21) (1.19, 26.75)
12
27.06 12.95 18.40 11.63 7.25
(5.91, 51.14) (2.90, 37.11) (2.66, 43.81) (1.70, 34.47) (1.01, 26.05)
16
27.83 13.59 17.88 11.92 7.68
(6.77, 50.80) (3.99, 37.90) (2.81, 40.85) (1.75, 33.98) (1.02, 25.92)
20
28.17 14.21 18.46 11.81 7.71
(6.76, 49.62) (4.90, 37.91) (3.31, 39.49) (2.00, 33.51) (1.11, 25.81)
24
28.21 14.39 18.66 11.85 7.87
(7.02, 48.75) (5.64, 38.18) (3.72, 38.71) (2.33, 33.02) (1.23, 25.52)
28
27.92 14.60 18.54 11.85 8.00
(7.19, 48.00) (6.23, 38.15) (4.14, 38.14) (2.65, 32.56) (1.48, 25.38)
30
27.78 14.64 18.48 11.81 7.97
(7.21, 47.64) (6.48, 38.15) (4.25, 38.05) (2.68, 32.34) (1.59, 25.43)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 2. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table 9: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 3
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
4.05 14.09 39.70 6.25 2.61
(0.13, 19.80) (1.71, 58.41) (8.94, 78.99) (0.66, 32.25) (0.45, 11.70)
4
28.01 24.99 17.91 9.59 5.12
(7.74, 48.65) (4.50, 50.14) (4.23, 37.20) (2.67, 27.08) (1.11, 19.03)
8
33.34 24.37 17.36 10.51 5.62
(7.39, 51.82) (4.35, 43.88) (3.80, 31.07) (1.97, 29.27) (1.18, 23.71)
12
34.61 25.82 14.18 11.46 5.88
(8.40, 55.76) (5.25, 43.42) (3.37, 26.43) (2.10, 30.79) (1.22, 24.93)
16
34.97 26.54 12.75 11.99 5.89
(9.14, 56.37) (6.06, 43.17) (3.40, 23.90) (2.26, 31.37) (1.16, 25.32)
20
34.64 27.22 12.39 12.20 6.01
(9.26, 56.75) (6.59, 42.86) (3.40, 23.06) (2.23, 31.53) (1.33, 25.39)
24
34.05 27.37 12.26 12.23 6.15
(9.16, 56.36) (7.13, 42.74) (3.36, 22.74) (2.35, 31.60) (1.39, 24.91)
28
33.74 27.55 12.10 12.53 6.37
(9.30, 56.15) (7.62, 42.60) (3.33, 22.45) (2.67, 31.63) (1.66, 24.61)
30
33.70 27.35 12.01 12.58 6.45
(9.50, 55.90) (7.90, 42.57) (3.31, 22.28) (2.83, 31.61) (1.72, 24.47)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 3. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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D Figures
Figure 23: Volatility from Kernel and Rolling days method
Notes: Long term (LT) and Short term (ST) conditional volatility, variance, correlation and
covariance for daily returns on S&P 500 and US 10 year Treasury bonds. The long run variances
are calculated by using a backward looking kernel of 250 days, whereas short run variances
are based on backward looking kernel of 5 days. The rolling days volatility calculation puts
equal weight on past 250 days for Long run and on past 5 days for Short run calculation. See
Appendix B.1 for a detailed methodology.
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Figure 24: Threshold approach to FTS
Notes: Cumulative probability density of observation (in circles) and time-varying threshold (solid line) on days that are considered
as FTS (i.e. when Probs < Prths). The threshold is set below ‘kappa’ times the conditional volatility of asset returns rt = (re,t, −rb,t).
Parentheses in chart titles signify the percentage of total days from 1965 to 2019 that count as FTS for a particular choice of threshold
criteria (or kappa). Y-axis: the probability of each FTS event, X-axis: date (in years).
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Figure 25: Ordinal index approach to FTS
Notes: FTS probability of observations whose Ordinal rank is above the rank of chosen threshold k. Varying levels of threshold are
set by choosing different k, or the 3rd weak feature of FTS, which requires the short to long run ratio of stock return volatility on
FTS day to be greater than k, s.t k > 1. Y-axis: the probability of each FTS event, X-axis: date (in years).
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Figure 26: FTS and FTR shocks from Ordinal index method
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Notes: Quarterly and monthly average of FTS and FTR probability calculated from
Ordinal index method discussed in Appendix B.3 with k equal to 1.
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Figure 27: Frequency and Likelihood of FTS days
Notes: Aggregated Likelihood (prob) & frequency (days) of Flight to Safety (FTS).
Aggregated by month (mth) & quarter (qtr) from 1963 to 2019. FTS days are calculated
by Ordinal index approach (see Appendix B.3), for k = 1.25. Aggregated likelihood,
or strength of FTS, for each month or quarter in the studied period is calculated by
adding the cdf probability value for each FTS day during that period.
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Figure 28: Time-series plots of US macroeconomic variables
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Notes : Cons(NDur+Svc) is the Non-surables and Services consumption, Rel.Px
Inv is relative price of Investment in terms of the price of Consumption. Rel.Px
Inv+Dur is relative price of Investment and Durables consumption in terms
of price of Services+Non durables consumption. px stands for price, Cons for
consumption, Inv for investment, Res for residential, emp for employee, vac for
vacancy. Except for ratios and series labelled in %, all other time series are in
logs. X-axis: years in last 2 digits (YY) format.
